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Economists generally assume that risk preferences are stable across decision con-
texts. The assumption of context-invariant risk preferences implies that multiple 
risky choices by the same economic unit should reflect the same degree of risk aver-
sion (or risk loving), even if the contexts of the decisions are different.1 This idea 
underlies standard models in many fields of economics, including finance, industrial 
organization, insurance, labor economics, and macroeconomics. It also motivates an 
important literature in empirical microeconomics—estimating risk preferences from 
data on choices in a single context. What is the empirical validity of this assump-
tion? Are estimates of risk preferences derived from choices in one context relevant 
for another context?
This paper addresses these questions by examining households’ insurance 
choices. We assemble and use a new dataset that records choices made by a sample 
of households in connection with three types of insurance coverage: auto collision, 
auto comprehensive, and home all perils. Among other things, the data contain 
households’ deductible choices for each type of coverage. The data also include 
1 As used in this paper, the “context” of a decision refers to all aspects of the choice situation other than the 
economic fundamentals.
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household-specific pricing menus of premium-deductible combinations, house-
holds’ claim histories, and information about the characteristics of each household.
We use the data to test whether a household’s deductible choices across coverage 
types reflect the same degree of risk aversion. Deductible choices are well suited to 
the task of estimating risk preferences—insurance markets exist primarily because 
of risk aversion, and the choice of a deductible involves a choice among lotteries 
over monetary outcomes. Moreover, our dataset is uniquely suited to directly test 
the assumption that risk preferences are stable across market contexts because it 
records multiple risky choices by the same households in similar yet distinct mar-
ket settings. Indeed, it is this key feature of our data that distinguishes us from our 
predecessors in the literature and allows us to study the issue of context-invariance 
with market choices.
Our test relies on a structural model of deductible choice that is based on Alma 
Cohen and Liran Einav (2007). The key assumptions of the model, which we revisit 
later in the paper, are that households are expected utility maximizers, that claims 
are generated by a Poisson process at the household-coverage level, and that house-
holds know their coverage-specific claim rates and use these claim rates in their 
expected utility calculus. We impose limited structure on a household’s Bernoulli 
utility function, assuming only that it is smooth, monotone, and state independent 
and has a negligible third derivative. We also assume that claims always exceed the 
maximum deductible option, that claims do not entail transaction costs (i.e., costs 
other than payment of the deductible), and that there is no moral hazard. Under the 
assumptions of the model, we derive an expression for the degree of absolute risk 
aversion at which a household is indifferent between two deductible options. This 
indifference point is a function of the deductible options, the associated premiums, 
and the household’s claim rate. We observe all of the variables necessary to cal-
culate a household’s indifference points except for its claim rates. We use data on 
claim realizations to predict the households’ claim rates. In particular, we treat the 
claim rates as latent random variables and estimate their conditional distributions 
under the assumption that they depend on observable and unobservable household 
characteristics.
Our test leverages the idea that each deductible choice by a household implies 
that its coefficient of absolute risk aversion lies between two indifference points. For 
example, if the household chooses a deductible of $500 from a menu of $100, $500, 
and $1,000, then the indifference point between $500 and $1,000 provides a lower 
bound on its coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the indifference point between 
$100 and $500 provides an upper bound. In this fashion, a household’s deductible 
choices in auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home identify three “test” inter-
vals that must contain its coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If these test intervals 
fail to intersect, then the household’s choices cannot be rationalized by the same 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
It is noteworthy that our test does not rely on statements about the reasonableness 
of the magnitude of the degree of risk aversion implied by households’ choices or on 
assumptions about the relationship between risk aversion over moderate and large 
stakes or between risk aversion and wealth. Rather, we test whether a household’s 
market choices over money lotteries of comparable size reflect the same degree of 
risk aversion measured at a particular wealth level (whatever it may be). Thus, our 
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study complements prior research on the empirical validity of the standard account 
of risk preferences (e.g., Paul A. Samuelson 1963; Matthew Rabin 2000; Rabin and 
Richard H. Thaler 2001).
We find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. 
Under the benchmark test, which maintains all our modeling assumptions and uses 
households’ predicted claim rates to calculate their test intervals, the fraction of 
households with threewise success (i.e., for whom the threewise intersection of 
its test intervals is nonempty) is 23 percent. This is quite low considering that it 
would be 14 percent if households were randomly assigned their deductible choices. 
However, one should not expect a success rate of 100 percent, as households’ true 
claim rates are bound to differ from their predicted claim rates due to unobserved 
heterogeneity. As a relevant point of comparison, we construct the “expected” suc-
cess rate—i.e., the success rate that we would expect under the null hypothesis of 
stable risk preferences given our modeling assumptions—and we find that it is 50 
percent, more than twice the actual success rate. Furthermore, we show that the 
residual variance in the claims data cannot likely account for the gap between the 
predicted claim rates and the claim rates that would be required to rationalize the 
deductible choices for many households. On the basis of our analysis, we conclude 
that unobserved heterogeneity is not a plausible explanation for the low rate of suc-
cess under the benchmark test.
Our analysis of the patterns of failure suggests that households with threewise 
failure typically exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than 
in their auto deductible choices. Overall, the average failing household would pay 
more than $45 to avoid facing a “home” lottery offering an equal chance of winning 
and losing $100, but would pay $30 or less to avoid facing an equivalent “auto” 
lottery. Our analysis also suggests that, once we control for risk type, none of age, 
gender, or wealth is predictive of success under the benchmark test.
As a supplement to our primary test, we offer an alternative test that uses the 
familiar Wald statistic to test whether the empirical distribution of deductible 
choices in the data is close to the distribution generated by the model under the 
hypothesis of stable risk preferences. The results of the alternative test reinforce 
our main findings. In addition, we check the robustness of our benchmark results to 
a number of alternative modeling assumptions. For instance, we consider the case 
of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility and we allow for the possibility 
that households weight their claim rates in the manner suggested by cumulative 
prospect theory (Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 1992). We also address cer-
tain methodological concerns and discuss and defend several other assumptions of 
the analysis. Finally, we briefly speculate about the potential for three alternative 
explanations—subjective beliefs, mistakes, and stochastic preferences—to explain 
our results.
The paper is related to two literatures that cut across economics and psychology. 
The first estimates risk preferences from observed choices. The majority of the stud-
ies in this literature rely on data from surveys (e.g., W. Kip Viscusi and William 
N. Evans 1990; Evans and Viscusi 1991; Robert J. Barksy et al. 1997; Miles S. 
Kimball, Claudia R. Sahm, and Matthew D. Shapiro 2008, 2009; Thomas Dohmen 
et al., forthcoming), laboratory or field experiments (e.g., Steven J. Kachelmeier and 
Mohamed Shehata 1992; Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury 2002; Syngjoo Choi 
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et al. 2007), or natural experiments in nonmarket settings such as game shows (for 
reviews, see Pavlo Blavatskyy and Ganna Pogrebna 2008; Thierry Post et al. 2008) 
or horse racing (e.g., Bruno Jullien and Bernard Salanié 2000). Only a handful of 
papers utilize data on risky choices by market participants. For instance, Atanu Saha 
(1997) uses data on production decisions to estimate firms’ risk preferences and Raj 
Chetty (2006) estimates risk aversion using data on labor supply decisions. A small 
group of papers use data on insurance choices. Charles J. Cicchetti and Jeffrey A. 
Dubin (1994) use the choice of whether to purchase interior telephone wire insur-
ance to estimate a consumer’s degree of risk aversion. Cohen and Einav (2007) 
structurally estimate risk preferences from the deductible choice in auto insurance. 
Most recently, Justin Sydnor (2010) uses the deductible choice in home insurance 
to estimate lower and upper bounds for a customer’s level of risk aversion. Each of 
these papers, however, studies unicontext choice and focuses on estimating the mag-
nitude of risk aversion in a single context, whereas we study multicontext choice 
and focus on the stability of risk preferences across contexts.
The second related literature documents violations of the principle of invariance. 
According to this principle, preferences over alternatives are invariant to extension-
ally equivalent reformulations of a decision problem (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). 
In the case of risky choice, the principle of invariance translates to the consequen-
tialist premise that preferences over risky alternatives are solely a function of the 
reduced lotteries over outcomes induced by the risky alternatives (Kenneth J. Arrow 
1951; Chris Starmer 2000). The studies in the invariance literature generally involve 
laboratory, field, or natural experiments (for reviews, see Tversky and Thaler 1990; 
Colin Camerer 1995; Rabin 1998; Starmer 2000; Kahneman 2003a, b).2 Notably, 
several studies find that preferences over money lotteries depend on whether they 
are framed as a “gamble” or as “insurance” (Paul J. H. Schoemaker and Howard C. 
Kunreuther 1979; John C. Hershey and Schoemaker 1980; Hershey, Kunreuther, 
and Schoemaker 1982), and one study finds that preferences over coinsurance 
depend on whether it is framed as a “deductible” or a “rebate” (Eric J. Johnson et al. 
1993). In addition, there are a number of studies that engage in descriptive analysis 
of certain real world phenomena that appear to contradict invariance (e.g., Thaler 
1980; Thomas C. Schelling 1981; Johnson et al. 1993; Edward J. McCaffery 1994; 
Johnson and Daniel G. Goldstein 2003).
We are aware of only two other studies that present direct evidence on the invari-
ance of risk preferences using data on risky choices by market participants. Charles 
Wolf and Larry Pohlman (1983) compare the risk preferences of a single dealer 
in US government securities inferred from his direct assessments of hypothetical 
gambles and from his bid decisions over a series of Treasury bill auctions. They 
find that “the dealer was substantially more risk averse in his bid choices than his 
assessments predicted” and conclude that individuals’ “degree of risk aversion 
may depend on the specific context in which their choices are made” (Wolf and 
Pohlman 1983, 849). Our paper overcomes two limitations of Wolf and Pohlman 
(1983). First, we study a large number of households as opposed to a single indi-
vidual. Second, we study actual choices made in three comparable market contexts, 
2 Recent examples include Choi et al. (2007) and Lisa R. Anderson and Jennifer M. Mellor (2009).
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whereas they compare hypothetical nonmarket choices with actual choices in one 
market context. Einav et al. (2010) use data on choices by Alcoa employees regard-
ing their 401(k) plans and five employer-provided insurance plans to investigate the 
stability of risk preferences across contexts. Their results reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no domain-general component of risk preferences. However, they also 
find that evidence that risk preferences become more context specific as the choice 
domains move farther apart. The key difference between Einav et al. (2010) and our 
paper is that we test a stronger hypothesis. Whereas they test the null hypothesis 
that risk preferences have no domain-general component, we test the null hypothesis 
that risk preferences are domain general. We share the view that the two papers (and 
their results) are highly complementary.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I develops the test of 
stable risk preferences. It presents the model of deductible choice, explains the con-
struction of the test intervals, and provides the basic intuition for the test. Section II 
describes the data. Section III delineates the empirical strategy. It discusses the 
empirical approach to predicting households’ claim rates and formulates the bench-
mark test. Section IV reports the claim rate estimates and the benchmark test results. 
It also includes our analysis of unobserved heterogeneity and the anatomy of fail-
ure. Section V presents the alternative test and a variety of other robustness checks. 
Concluding remarks appear in Section VI. Supplemental material appears in an 
Appendix and a Web Appendix.
I. A Test of Stable Risk Preferences
A. Model of Deductible Choice
We model households’ deductible choices according to expected utility theory. 
Let  w​i and  u​i (⋅) denote household i ’s wealth and Bernoulli utility function, respec-
tively. We assume that  u​i (⋅) is thrice continuously differentiable, monotone, and state 
independent and has a negligible third derivative. We otherwise impose no structure 
on the Bernoulli utility function.
Households have access to three types of insurance coverage: auto collision (L), 
auto comprehensive (M ), and home all perils (H  ).3 Each type of coverage pro-
vides full insurance against covered losses in excess of a deductible chosen by the 
household. The deductible for each coverage is chosen from a household-coverage 
specific pricing menu that associates a premium with each deductible. For each 
household i and coverage j, let  ​ij denote the pricing menu,  d​ij denote the deduct-
ible, pij denote the associated premium, and  t​ij denote the duration of coverage. A 
policy is a premium-deductible pair, (​pij,  d​ij ). In the data, auto policies are semian-
nual contracts and home policies are annual contracts. Accordingly,  t​ij is the number 
of semiannual periods of coverage for j​=​L, M and the number of annual periods 
of coverage for j​=​H.
We assume that household i’ s claims under coverage j are generated by a Poisson 
process having rate  λ​ij , where  λ​ij is a semiannual rate for j​=​L, M and an annual rate 
3 A brief description of each type of coverage appears in the Appendix. For simplicity, we often refer to home 
all perils simply as home.
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for j​=​H. Under this assumption, the household’s claim arrivals are independent 
across coverages (as well as within each coverage) even if its claim rates are cor-
related. In addition, we assume that: (i) households know their claim rates; (ii) the 
value of every claim under each coverage exceeds the maximum deductible avail-
able for such coverage; (iii) the only cost associated with a claim is payment of the 
deductible; and (iv) deductible choices do not influence claim rates, i.e., households 
do not suffer from moral hazard. In Section V, we consider relaxing these and other 
key assumptions of the model.
Under the terms of the policies in the data, the insured generally can change any 
deductible or cancel any coverage at any time and pay a linearly weighted or pro-
rated premium. On this basis, we assume that households view their deductible 
choices as short-term commitments. Accordingly, we model deductible choice as a 
static decision problem.
Given our assumptions, the expected utility to household i from choosing policies 
{(​pij,  d​ij ):​j​=​L, M, H } from pricing menus {​​ij ​:​j​=​L, M, H } is given by
(1)​ ​V​i ((​​p​iL , d​iL ),  (​p​iM ,  d​iM ), (​ p​iH ,  d​iH ))​=​
(1​−​​λ​iL  t​iL )​{​​​ (1​−​​λ​iM  t​iM )[(1​−​​λ​iH  t​iH )​​u​i (​_​w i )​+​​λ​iH  t​iH ​​u​i (​_​w i ​−​​d​iH )]​   +​ ​λ​iM  t​iM [(1​−​​λ​iH  t​iH )​​u​i (​_​w i ​−​​d​iM )​+​​λ​iH  t​iH ​​u​i (​_​w i ​−​​d​iM ​−​​d​iH )]​​}​,
+​ ​λ​iL t​iL {​​​ (1​−​​λ​iM t​iM )[(1​−​​λ​iH t​iH )​​u​i (​_​w i ​−​​d​iL )​+​​λ​iH  t​iH ​​u​i (​_​w i ​−​​d​iL ​−​​d​iH )]​  +​ ​λ​iM  t​iM [(1​−​​λ​iH  t​iH )​​u​i (​_​w i ​−​​d​iL ​−​​d​iM )​+​​λ​iH  t​iH ​​u​i (​_​w i ​−​​d​iL ​−​​d​iM ​−​​d​iH )]​​}​,
where  
_​w i ​ =​ ​w​i ​−​​p​iL  t​iL ​−​​p​iM  t​iM ​−​​p​iH  t​iH is household i’s net wealth.
B. Construction of Test Intervals
Suppose household i can choose between two auto collision policies (​​p​iL​l  ,  d​iL​l  ) and (​​p​iL​h  ,  d​iL​h  ), with  d​iL​h  >​​d​iL​l  and  p​iL​l  >​​p​iL​h  .4 Given  (  p​iM ,  d​iM ) and  (  p​iH ,  d​iH ) , household i 
is indifferent between the two policies when
  V​i ((​​p​iL​l  ,  d​iL​l  ), (​ p​iM ,  d​iM ), (​ p​iH ,  d​iH ))​=​ ​V​i ((​​p​iL​h  ,  d​iL​h  ), (​ p​iM ,  d​iM ), (​ p​iH ,  d​iH )).
Solving this equation for  λ​iL and taking limits as  t​ij →​0 for all j, we have
(2)​ ​λ​iL ​ =​ ​ (​​p​iL​
l
  −​​p​iL​h  )​u​i​′(​w​i )__​​​​u​i (​w​i ​−​​d​iL​l  )​−​​u​i (​w​i ​−​​d​iL​h  )​
or
4 To be clear, the superscripts on  p​iL and  d​iL correspond to the deductible amount, where l denotes the low deduct-
ible and h denotes the high deductible. Accordingly,  p​iL​l  denotes the premium associated with the low deductible,
 d​iL​l  , and  p​iL​h  denotes the premium associated with the high deductible,  d​iL​h  .
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(3)  1 _​​λ​iL   (​​p​iL​
l
  −​​p​iL​h  )​u​i​′(​w​i )​=​ ​u​i (​w​i ​−​​d​iL​l  )​−​​u​i (​w​i ​−​​d​iL​h  ).
Note that over small time intervals the choice of auto collision policy is not influ-
enced by the choice of auto comprehensive or home policy. This is driven by the fact 
that claim arrivals are independent and the probability of experiencing two claims 
under one or more coverages is negligible.
Let  r​iL​l,h denote the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (at wealth level  w​i ) at 
which the household is indifferent between the two policies. Taking Taylor expan-
sions of both terms on the right-hand side of equation (3), we obtain
  r​iL​l,h ≈​ ​
​ (​p​iL​l  −​​p​iL​h  )​​_​​λ​iL (​d​iL​h  −​​d​iL​l  )​−​1  __​​​1 _​
2
 (​d​iL​h  +​​d​iL​l  )
​ .
Let  r​i denote the household’s true coefficient of absolute risk aversion. It follows 
that the household chooses (​​p​iL​l  ,  d​iL​l  ) if  r​i ​>​​r​iL​l,h and (​​p​iL​h  ,  d​iL​h  ) if  r​i ​<​​r​iL​l,h .
Now suppose household i can choose among k auto collision policies {(​​p​iL​k  ,  d​iL​k  ):​k​=​1, … , k } , where  d​iL​1  <​​d​iL​2  <​⋅⋅⋅​<​​d​iL​k−1 ​<​​d​iL​k  and  p​iL​1  >​​p​iL​2  >​⋅⋅⋅>​​p​iL​k−1 ​>​​p​iL​k  . When the household chooses policy (​​p​iL​k  ,  d​iL​k  ), its choice implies
   r​i ∈​​​iL ​ =​ { [​​max ​h>k  r​iL​1,h ,​+​∞) if k​ =​ 1[​​max ​h>k  r​iL​k,h , ​​min ​l<k  r​iL​l,k ] if 2​≤​k​≤​k​−​1 .(−​∞,​​min ​l<k  r​iL​l,k ] if k​ =​k
That is, the household’s choice of auto collision deductible identifies an interval, 
 ​iL , that contains its coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Exactly in the same fash-
ion, the household’s choice of auto comprehensive deductible identifies a second 
interval,  ​iM , and its choice of home deductible identifies a third interval,  ​iH . We 
refer to  ​iL ,  ​iM , and  ​iH as household i’s test intervals.
C. Basic Intuition of the Test
Provided that household i’s test intervals are nonempty,5 we can ask whether they 
intersect. If the test intervals intersect, then any coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
contained in the intersection can rationalize the household’s deductible choices. If, 
however, the test intervals do not intersect, then the household’s deductible choices 
cannot be rationalized by the same coefficient of absolute risk aversion. We refer to 
the fraction of households with nonempty intervals/intersections as the success rate. 
All of the variables necessary to calculate household i’s test intervals are observable, 
except for the claim rates,  λ​iL ,  λ​iM , and  λ​iH . For this reason, we must use predicted 
claim rates to calculate households’ test intervals. Because we use predicted claim 
5 For a discussion of empty test intervals, see the Web Appendix.
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rates, the expected success rate (i.e., the success rate that we would expect under the 
null hypothesis of stable risk preferences given our modeling assumptions) is less 
than 100 percent. Therefore, the conclusion of the test—namely, whether the null 
hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data—turns on comparing the 
success rate with the expected success rate. We provide a precise formulation of the 
test, including the procedures for predicting the claim rates and for constructing the 
expected success rate, in Section III.
II. Data
A. Overview
We acquired the data from an independent insurance agent located in a north-
eastern state of the United States. The agent offers multiple lines of insurance on 
behalf of a number of regional and national insurance companies. The data com-
prise information on households who purchased or renewed auto collision, auto 
comprehensive, or home coverage through the agent between 1993 and 2007. For 
each household, the data contain all the information in the agent’s records regard-
ing the household’s policies, the claims reported thereunder, and the characteristics 
of the household. The data also include household-coverage specific pricing menus 
of premium-deductible combinations that we constructed using rating information 
provided by the agent (see Section IIC).
For purposes of our analysis, we group the data into three nonmutually exclusive 
samples: Auto, Home, and Test. We use the Auto and Home samples to perform 
claim rate regressions, the results of which we use to generate predicted claim rates 
for the Test sample (see Sections IIIA and IVA).6 The Auto sample contains 1,689 
households who purchased or renewed auto collision or auto comprehensive cov-
erage and for whom we have complete information regarding their claims and the 
variables that enter as covariates in the claim rate regressions for auto collision or 
auto comprehensive. Similarly, the Home sample contains 1,298 households who 
purchased or renewed home coverage and for whom we have complete informa-
tion regarding their claims and the variables that enter as covariates in the claim 
rate regression for home. We perform our test of stable risk preferences on the Test 
sample. The Test sample contains 702 households who purchased or renewed all 
three types of coverages—auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home—through 
the agent and for whom we have complete information regarding their deductible 
choices and the variables necessary to calculate their test intervals. Due to these 
stringent inclusion requirements, the Test sample is notably smaller than the regres-
sion samples. To address concerns about selection issues and raise confidence that 
the Test sample constitutes a representative sample of the households in the data, we 
perform informal and formal checks (see Sections IIB, IVA, and VB).
6 For this reason we occasionally refer to the Auto and Home samples collectively as the regression samples.
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B. Household Characteristics and Claims
Descriptive statistics for the Auto and Home samples, as well as comparable sta-
tistics for the Test sample, are set forth in the Web Appendix. An informal compari-
son of means suggests that moving from the Auto and Home samples to the Test 
sample does not introduce any worrisome selection bias. This is confirmed when we 
formally compare the empirical distributions of the predicted claim rates in the Auto 
and Home samples, on the one hand, and the Test sample, on the other hand (see 
Section IVA), and when we compare the benchmark test results for the Test sample 
with test results for the subsample of Test sample households for whom we have 
complete claims information (see Section VB).
Table 1 summarizes the claim histories of the households in the Auto and Home 
samples. The mean semiannual claim rates for auto collision and auto comprehen-
sive are 0.058 and 0.037, respectively, and the mean annual claim rate for home is 
0.052. We note that our claim rates comport with the national claim rates reported 
by the Insurance Information Institute (2010a, b).7 In addition, we note that: (i) the 
auto claim rate reported by Cohen and Einav (2007) for a sample of Israeli drivers 
is greater than the sum of our auto claim rates,8 which is consistent with the fact that 
the road accident and motor vehicle theft rates in Israel are greater than the rates 
in the United States;9 and (ii) the home claim rate reported by Sydnor (2010) for 
a sample of homeowners in a western state is approximately four-fifths our home 
claim rate,10 which seems reasonable considering regional differences in climate and 
age of housing stock.
7 The Insurance Information Institute (2010b) reports an average annual home claim rate of 0.052 for 2005–
2007. For auto collision and comprehensive, the Insurance Information Institute (2010a) reports average per vehicle 
annual claim rates of 0.050 and 0.024 for the same period. Although these are lower than our semiannual auto claim 
rates, we believe three factors account for the discrepancy: (i) the Institute’s auto comprehensive claim rate excludes 
wind and water losses; (ii) our auto claim rates are per policy, 37 percent of which cover at least two vehicles and 
11 percent of which cover at least three vehicles; and (iii) the state we study is one of the most expensive states for 
auto insurance, suggesting that we should expect our claim rates to be above the national average.
8 Cohen and Einav (2007) report an average annual claim rate of 0.245 for Israeli auto comprehensive coverage, 
which is an amalgamation of US auto collision and auto comprehensive coverages.
9 According to the International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group (2009), the rate of injury accidents per 
one million vehicle kilometers in 2008 was 0.35 in Israel and 0.06 in the United States. According to Sergio Herzog 
(2002), the annual rate of motor vehicle thefts per one thousand registered motor vehicles between 1994 and 1997 
ranged from 19.1 to 28.3 in Israel and from 6.4 to 7.6 in the United States.
10 Sydnor (2010) reports an average annual claim rate of 0.042.
Table 1—Claims
Standard
Observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Auto sample
Collision claim rate (semiannual) 1,689 0.058 0.136 0.000 2.645
Comprehensive claim rate (semiannual) 1,689 0.037 0.092 0.000 1.630
Policy duration (semiannual periods) 1,689 9.79 6.75 0.04 35.46
Home sample
Claim rate (annual) 1,298 0.052 0.131 0.000 1.848
Policy duration (annual periods) 1,298 5.04 3.29 0.03 16.48
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C. Pricing Menus, Premiums, and Deductibles
As a group, the households in the data purchased or renewed their auto and home 
policies from nine insurance companies. Of the nine companies, one offers only 
auto policies, four offer only home policies, and four offer both auto and home poli-
cies. Each company uses the same procedure to price, or rate, its policies. Suppose 
household i wishes to obtain a quote for coverage j. First, upon observing the house-
hold’s characteristics,  x​ij , the company determines a benchmark premium  _​p ij (i.e., 
the premium associated with a benchmark deductible  
_​d j , e.g.,  
_​d L ​=​$200) according 
to a proprietary rating function,  
_​p ij​ =​ fj(​x​ij ). Second, it generates a household-cov-
erage specific pricing menu  ​ij ​=​{(​​p​ij​k ,  d​ij​k ):​k​=​1, … , k } that associates a pre-
mium  p​ij​k with each deductible  d​ij​k according to a proprietary multiplication rule,  p​ij​k =​gj(​d​j​k )​​_​p ij, with gj(​_​d j )​=​1. After the company rates the policy, it quotes the pricing 
menu to the household. The household then chooses its preferred policy from the 
pricing menu, (​p*ij​,  d​ij​* )​∈​​​ij .
For each household i in the Auto and Test samples, we observe the household’s 
most recent policy choices {(​p*ij​,  d​ij​* ):​j​=​L, M, H }, but we do not observe the pric-
ing menus {​​ij ​:​j​=​L, M, H } that were quoted to the household. However, we were 
able to ascertain for all nine companies the multiplication rules {gj:​j​=​L, M, H } 
that were in effect in 2007. Applying these multiplication rules, we construct pricing 
menus {​  ​ij ​:​j​=​L, M, H } for each household i in the Auto and Test samples. (We 
also observe the policy choices of most households in the Home sample. However, 
unless a household is also in the Auto or Test sample, we do not need to construct 
pricing menus for the household because we do not use the benchmark premium as 
a covariate in the home regression (see the Web Appendix)). We use these pricing 
menus throughout our analysis. In particular, we use them to calculate the bench-
mark premiums  
_​p iL and  _​p iM , which enter as covariates in the auto regressions, and 
the test intervals  ℐ​iL ,  ℐ​iM , and  ℐ​iH , which enter our test of stable risk preferences.11
We recognize, of course, that   ​ij ≠​ij if a different benchmark premium or 
multiplication rule was in effect at the time household i made its deductible choice 
for coverage j. However, there are (at least) two reasons to believe that   ​ij ≊​​​ij 
for nearly all i, j. First, 93 percent of the policies in the Auto sample and 66 percent 
of the policies in the Test sample were purchased or renewed in 2007. We are confi-
dent that the pricing menus for these policies are accurate. Second, each company’s 
rating scheme must be approved by the state insurance department. As a result, the 
pricing menus are quite stable over time.12 Nearly 100 percent of the policies in the 
Auto sample and 89 percent of the policies in the Test sample were purchased or 
renewed during or after 2004. Therefore, we are confident that the vast majority of 
the pricing menus are accurate or approximately so.
11 Note that   ​ij includes only the deductible options offered by the company from which household i purchased 
or renewed its policy for coverage j. This is conservative—including deductible options offered by other companies 
could only make the household’s test intervals narrower.
12 We were able to confirm for seven companies that their home multiplication rules have not changed since 
at least 2003. For two of these companies we were able to confirm that their home multiplication rules have not 
changed since at least 1999. For the eighth home insurance company, we were able to confirm that its multiplication 
rule has not changed since at least 2006. We also were able to confirm for one company that its auto multiplication 
rules have not changed since at least 1998. We were not able to trace the evolution of the auto multiplication rules 
for the other four auto insurance companies.
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Tables 2 and 3 summarize the policy choices for households in the Test sample. 
The most popular deductible choices were $200, $250, and $500 for auto colli-
sion and auto comprehensive and $250 and $500 for home coverage. No household 
chose an auto deductible in excess of $1,000, and only four households chose a 
home deductible in excess $1,000. In light of this pattern, and taking into consider-
ation the variation in the deductible options across companies, we limit the pricing 
menus to the following deductible options:13
• Auto collision:  {$100, $200, $250, $500, $1,000, $2,000, $2,500} ;
•  Auto  comprehensive:  {$50, $100, $200, $250, $500, $1,000, $1,500, $2,000} ; 
• Home:  {$50, $100, $200, $250, $500, $1,000, $2,000, $2,500, $5000} .
Given how we calculate a household’s test intervals, limiting the pricing menus 
to these deductible options is without loss of generality. Indeed, it is conservative 
because including additional deductible options could only make a household’s test 
intervals narrower.
13 Of course, each household-coverage specific pricing menu contains only those deductible options that are 
offered by the company that issued the policy to the household.
Table 2—Premiums
Standard
Observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Auto collision premium (dollars) 702 169.56 87.24 27.40 689.00
Auto comprehensive premium (dollars) 702 83.66 51.74 10.90 298.00
Home premium (dollars) 702 580.56 265.27 101.00 2,235.48
Table 3—Deductible Choices
Auto collision Auto comprehensive Home
Deductible Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
$50 — — 34 4.84 0 0.00
$100 9 1.28 28 3.99 16 2.28
$150 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
$200 170 24.22 258 36.75 0 0.00
$250 127 18.09 100 14.25 487 69.37
$300 0 0.00 0 0.00 — —
$400 0 0.00 0 0.00 — —
$500 363 51.71 264 37.61 154 21.94
$1,000 33 4.70 18 2.56 41 5.84
$1,500 0 0.00 0 0.00 — —
$2,000 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.14
$2,500 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 0.43
$5,000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
$10,000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Total 702 100.00 702 100.00 702 100.00
Notes:​A dash indicates that no company offers the deductible option. Italics indicate that only one company offers 
the deductible option.
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III. Empirical Strategy
A. Predicting Claim Rates
All of the variables necessary to calculate household i’s test intervals are observ-
able, except for the claim rates,  λ​iL ,  λ​iM , and  λ​iH . We treat the claim rates as latent 
random variables and assume that for each household i and coverage j,
 ln λ​ij ​ =​ ​x​ij​′​β​j ​+​​ε​ij ,
where (i)  x​ij is a vector of observables and (ii) for each coverage j, the  ε​ij , which 
reflect potential unobserved heterogeneity, are independent across households and 
exp(​ε​ij ) follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance  α​j . Under this 
assumption, the number of claims that household i realizes under coverage j follows 
a negative binomial distribution with conditional mean  μ​ij ​ =​ exp(​x​ij​′​β​j )​t​ij and 
variance  μ​ij ​+​​α​j μ​ij​2 (A. Colin Cameron and Pravin K. Trivedi 1998). Consequently, 
we can perform standard negative binomial regressions to obtain maximum 
likelihood estimates of  β​j and  α​j for each coverage j. We then use these estimates to 
predict the claim rates for each household.
B. formulation of the Benchmark Test
In the benchmark test, we calculate household i’s test intervals {​ ​ij :​j​=​L, M, H } 
using its predicted claim rates {​ λ​ij ​=​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j ):​j​=​L, M, H }. We then verify 
whether each test interval is nonempty and whether the test intervals’ pairwise and 
threewise intersections are nonempty. Strictly speaking, we verify whether: (i) for 
each test interval, the upper bound exceeds the lower bound; and (ii) for each pair of 
test intervals and for the triple (​ ​iL ,   ​iM ,   ​iH ), the minimum upper bound of the test 
intervals exceeds the maximum lower bound of the test intervals.
We refer to the fraction of households with nonempty intervals/intersections as 
the success rate. In general, we do not expect success rates of 100 percent. This is 
because we calculate the test intervals using households’ predicted claim rates as 
opposed to their true claim rates (which are unobservable). Therefore, we construct 
expected success rates as the relevant points of comparison. The expected success 
rate is the success rate that one would expect the sample to achieve in the bench-
mark test under the null hypothesis that households have stable risk preferences and 
assuming that our model of deductible choice and our estimates for  β​j and  α​j for 
each coverage j are correct.14
We construct the expected success rate as follows. first, because we find no 
unobserved heterogeneity in auto collision (i.e.,   α​L ​=​0; see Section IVA), for each 
household i we treat its predicted auto collision claim rate,   λ​iL , as its true auto colli-
sion claim rate and we assume that its true coefficient of absolute risk aversion lies 
in its auto collision interval,   ​iL . second, we take a draw from a uniform distribution 
14 For each coverage j, we denote by   β​j and   α​j our estimates for  β​j and  α​j , respectively.
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over   ​iL and treat it as household i’s true coefficient of absolute risk aversion.15 Third, 
we draw exp(​ε​iM ) from gamma(1/​ α​M ,   α​M ) and exp(​ε​iH ) from gamma(1/​ α​H ,   α​H ) and 
take   λ​iM ​×​exp(​ε​iM ) and   λ​iH ​×​exp(​ε​iH ) as household i’s true auto comprehensive 
and home claim rates. fourth, we determine each household’s optimal deductible 
choices and calculate the test intervals implied by such choices using its predicted 
claim rates (just as we do when we compute the benchmark success rate). fifth, we 
compute the success rate. Repeating steps two through five 1,000 times, we con-
struct the expected success rate (mean) as well as a 95 percent confidence interval.
The conclusion of the test turns on comparing the success rate with the expected 
success rate. Specifically, we reject the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences if 
the success rate lies outside the 95 percent confidence interval for the expected suc-
cess rate.
C. size and Power of the Test
Because the test is not an exact test in the statistical sense,16 it is useful to calcu-
late its size and power. Our test rejects the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences 
if the success rate lies outside the two-sided 95 percent confidence interval for the 
expected success rate. When the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences is false, 
the expected success rate can only exceed the success rate. Therefore, under the 
foregoing rejection rule, the nominal significance level of the test effectively is 2.5 
percent. According to our simulations, at the 2.5 percent level the size of the test 
is 1.7 percent, which suggests that the test is slightly more conservative than the 
nominal level indicates. This relationship also holds at other common significance 
levels. The power of the test, which is a function of the magnitude of the deviation 
of the alternative hypothesis from the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences, has 
desirable properties as well. At each of the common significance levels, including 
the 2.5 percent level, we find that the power is low for moderate deviations and 
then rapidly increases (first at an increasing rate and then at a decreasing rate as it 
approaches 100 percent) with the magnitude of the deviation. For instance, at the 
2.5 percent level, when we allow households’ risk aversion coefficients to differ ran-
domly across coverages by no more than 25 percent, our simulations indicate that 
the power of the test is 2.4 percent; when we allow them to differ by up to 75 per-
cent, the power is 32.9 percent; and when we allow them to differ by as much as 100 
percent, the power is 89.5 percent. This implies that relatively small differences in 
risk preferences across contexts are not likely to trigger rejection of the null hypoth-
esis, suggesting another sense in which the test is conservative. More detailed size 
and power calculations and a discussion of our procedures appear in the Appendix.
15 If   ​iL lacks a finite lower or upper bound (which is the case for 19 households), we close the interval by impos-
ing a lower bound equal to one-half the minimum finite lower bound in the Test sample (if positive) or twice the 
minimum finite lower bound in the Test sample (if negative) or an upper bound equal to twice the maximum finite 
upper bound in the Test sample, as the case may be.
16 In an exact test, the finite sample distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis is known.
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IV. Results
A. Regressions and Predicted Claim Rates
The results of the claim rate regressions are set forth in the Web Appendix. For 
auto comprehensive and home, we report the estimates from negative binomial 
regressions. For auto collision, however, we report the estimates of a Poisson regres-
sion, because a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis of equidisper-
sion (i.e.,  α​L ​=​0).17 In each regression, the dependent variable is the number of 
claims, and we control for variation in exposure (i.e., policy duration). The regres-
sion results indicate that auto claim rates (collision and comprehensive) are greater 
for households with a prior accident or a second vehicle. In addition, collision claim 
rates are greater for households in which the primary driver is married, the primary 
or secondary driver is female, or any driver is below age 21. Finally, home claim 
rates are greater for homes that are not owner occupied and increase with the insured 
value and age of the home.
For purposes of our analysis, we are not interested in the regression results per se. 
Rather, we use the estimates from the auto and home regressions to generate pre-
dicted claim rates—{​ λ​ij ​=​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j ):​j​=​L, M, H }—for each household i. Table 4 
summarizes the predicted claim rates for households in the Test sample and pro-
vides comparable statistics for the regression samples. In the Test sample, the mean 
predicted semiannual claim rates for auto collision and auto comprehensive are 
0.055 and 0.037, respectively, and the mean predicted annual claim rate for home is 
0.058. These are nearly identical to the corresponding mean predicted claim rates 
in the regression samples (0.057, 0.037, and 0.059).18 Indeed, for each coverage j, 
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject at the 10 percent level the equality of the 
empirical distribution of   λ​ij in the Test sample and in the corresponding regression 
sample. In terms of risk profile, therefore, we are comfortable that the Test sample 
constitutes a representative sample of the households in the data.
B. Benchmark Test Results
Table 5 presents the results of the benchmark test. It reports success rates as well 
as expected success rates. The results clearly favor rejection of the null hypothesis 
17 Our regression model assumes that the number of claims that household i realizes under coverage j follows a 
negative binomial distribution with conditional mean  μ​ij ​ =​ exp(​x​ij​′​β​j )​t​ij and variance  μ​ij ​+​​α​j  μ​ij​2 (see Section IIIA). 
The model reduces to a Poisson model if the dispersion parameter,  α​j , equals zero (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). If α​j ​=​0, the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically more efficient (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge 
2002). For each coverage j, we estimate both negative binomial and Poisson models and perform a likelihood ratio 
test of the null hypothesis of equidispersion ( α​j ​=​0) against the alternative of overdispersion ( α​j ​>​0). As reported 
in the Web Appendix, we reject the null hypothesis in the case of auto comprehensive and home. The point estimates 
for  α​M and  α​H are 0.2171 and 0.5876, respectively. However, we do not reject the null hypothesis in the case of auto 
collision—the point estimate for  α​L is 0.0028 and the p-value of the test statistic is 0.48. Accordingly, we report the 
negative binomial estimates for auto comprehensive and home and the Poisson estimates for auto collision. (We 
note that the Poisson and negative binomial estimates for auto collision are virtually identical.) It is noteworthy that 
Cohen and Einav (2007)—who study Israeli auto comprehensive coverage, which, as noted above, is an amalgama-
tion of US auto collision and auto comprehensive coverages—report a dispersion coefficient of 0.023, which lies 
between our estimates for  α​L and  α​M .
18 They are also in line with the corresponding mean observed claim rates reported in Table 1 (0.058, 0.037, and 
0.052).
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of stable risk preferences. The success rates for individual deductible choices are 
respectable—89 percent for auto collision (this is by construction), 89 percent for 
auto comprehensive, and 100 percent for home—albeit less than expected in the 
case of auto comprehensive.19 However, none of the pairwise success rates exceeds 
50 percent and each is well outside the 95 percent confidence interval for the cor-
responding expected success rate. When we consider all three deductible choices, 
the success rate is only 23 percent. This is quite low considering not only that the 
expected threewise success rate is 50 percent (with a 95 percent confidence interval 
of [0.47, 0.54]) but also that the threewise success rate would be 14 percent if house-
holds were randomly assigned their deductible choices.20
19 Similarly, Cohen and Einav (2007) find that about 10 percent of the individuals in their sample choose a high 
auto deductible when their predicted claim rate implies a choice of low auto deductible for any level of risk aversion.
20 In calculating the pairwise and threewise success rates and expected success rates, we do not distinguish 
between failures due to empty intervals and failures due to empty intersections. Given  λ​ij ​ =​ ​ λ​ij , empty intervals 
are indicative of making dominated choices, whereas empty intersections are indicative of making inconsistent 
choices. However, if  λ​ij ​≠​​ λ​ij , these interpretations are improper. In any case, pooling these two types of failure 
does not affect the conclusion of the test. In the subsample of 550 households with three nonempty intervals, the 
pairwise and threewise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected success rates. For instance, 
the threewise success rate is 0.30 while the threewise expected threewise success rate is 0.57 (with a 95 percent 
confidence interval of [0.53, 0.61]).
Table 4—Predicted Claim Rates
Standard 1st 99th
Observations Mean deviation percentile percentile
Test sample
Auto collision 702 0.055 0.031 0.019 0.151
Auto comprehensive 702 0.037 0.018 0.012 0.092
Home 702 0.058 0.017 0.028 0.101
Auto sample
Auto collision 1,689 0.057 0.030 0.019 0.157
Auto comprehensive 1,689 0.037 0.017 0.013 0.088
Home sample
Home 1,298 0.059 0.020 0.026 0.111
Notes: Semiannual claim rates for auto collision and auto comprehensive. Annual claim rates for home.
Table 5—Benchmark Test Results
Success Expected 95 percent
Deductible choice(s) rate success rate confidence interval
Auto collision 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Auto comprehensive 0.89 0.99 0.98 0.99
Home 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.50 0.72 0.70 0.75
Auto collision and home 0.48 0.68 0.65 0.70
Auto comprehensive and home 0.42 0.76 0.73 0.79
Auto collision and auto comprehensive and home 0.23 0.50 0.47 0.54
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C. Additional Results
Unobserved Heterogeneity.—Among other things, the benchmark test results 
imply that unobserved heterogeneity cannot fully account for the low rates of suc-
cess in the Test sample. In this section, we offer a direct assessment of whether 
unobserved heterogeneity is a plausible explanation for the low benchmark success 
rates. Our approach is based on the premise that any unobserved household hetero-
geneity is captured in the model by the error term,  ε​ij , the exponential of which is 
assumed to follow a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance  α​j .
Intuitively, our strategy is as follows. For each household i in the Test sample, 
we find the home claim rate  ˜  λ​iH nearest to the household’s predicted home claim 
rate   λ​iH such that the household’s home test interval intersects with both of its auto 
test intervals (see Figure 1). In other words,  ˜  λ​iH​b  is the claim rate nearest to   λ​iH​b  that 
has the potential to rationalize the household’s deductible choices. We then compute 
the implied error terms,  ˜  ε​iH​b  =​ ln  ˜  λ​iH ​−​ln   λ​iH , and assess whether their exponen-
tials plausibly could have come from the error distribution we estimate in the Home 
regression, gamma(1/​ α​H ,   α​H ). By construction,  ˜  ε​iH represents a conservative metric 
of the minimum deviation from the predicted claim rate   λ​iH that is necessary to ren-
der the household’s deductible choices consistent.21
We formally proceed in five steps. first, for each household i in the Test sample, 
we generate 10,000 bootstrap test intervals for auto collision and auto compre-
hensive, {(​ ​iL​​b  ,  ˜  ​iM​b  )​}​b=1​10,000 , according to the following procedure. In each bootstrap 
repetition b, we (i) generate bootstrap estimates   β​L​b ,   β​M​b  ,   β​H​b  , and   α​M​b  (we do not 
 bootstrap   α​L because a likelihood ratio test does not reject the null hypothesis that
 α​L ​=​0 (see Section IVA)); (ii) draw  exp(​ ε​iM​b  ) from gamma(1/​ α​M​b  ,   α​M​b  ); and (iii) use
  λ​iL​b  =​ exp(​x​ij​′​ β​L​b ) and  ˜  λ​iM​b  =​ exp(​x​ij​′​ β​M​b  +​​ ε​iM​b  ) to calculate   ​iL​​b  and  ˜  ​iM​b  . second, 
we construct 10,000 “minimum distance” claim rates for home, {​˜  λ​iH​b  }​b=1​10,000 . The
minimum distance claim rate  ˜  λ​iH​b  solves the program mi n​​λ​iH​b  ∈​Λ​i​b ​  ​ ​​|​ λ​iH​b  −​​ λ​iH​b  |, 
where   λ​iH​b  =​ exp(​x​ij​′​ β​H​b  ) is the predicted claim rate and  Λ​i​b is the set of all claim 
rates  λ​iH​b  such that the associated home interval  ​iH​b  (i.e., the interval  ​iH​b  calculated
using  λ​iH​b  ) intersects with both of the bootstrap auto intervals   ​iL​b  and
 ˜  ​​iM​b  .22 Third, we compute “minimum distance” epsilons for home, {​˜  ε​iH​b  }​b=1​10,000 ,
where  ˜  ε​iH​b  =​ ln ˜  λ​iH​b  −​ln  λ​iH​b  . fourth, we construct the empirical distribution  ˜  f of 
exp(​˜  ε​iH ). For each bootstrap repetition b, we calculate the order statistics  ˜  ε​(i)H​b  of 
the  ˜  ε​iH​b  and take the average  ˜  ε​(i)H ​=​1/10,000  ∑​b=1​10,000​​˜  ε​(i)H​b  at each position [i]. 
We then define  ˜  f (exp(ε))​=​1/702  ∑​i=1​702 1 [exp(​˜  ε​(i)H )​≤​exp(ε)], where 1[⋅] is
the indicator function. Taking the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles at each posi-
tion (i), we construct a bootstrap 95 percent confidence interval for  ˜  f . fifth, we 
compare  ˜  f to   f :=​gamma(1/​ α​H ,   α​H ), the distribution we estimate from the Home 
sample.
21 Alternatively, we could have constructed in the same fashion “minimum distance” epsilons for auto compre-
hensive,  ˜  ε​iM , and assessed whether the exp(​˜  ε​iM ) plausibly could have come from gamma(1/0.22, 0.22). Because, 
under either approach, we would perform the bootstrap procedure described below, our analysis and conclusions 
qualitatively would remain unchanged.
22 Strictly speaking,  Λ​i​b is the set of all claim rates  λ​iH​b  such that either (i) the lower bound of  ​iH​b  is less than 
the minimum upper bound of   ​iL​b  and  ˜  ​iM​b  or (ii) the upper bound of   ​iH​b  is greater than the maximum lower bound 
of   ​iL​b  and  ˜  ​iM​b  .
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Figure 2 presents a visual comparison of  ˜  f and   f for values of exp(​ε​iH )​≥​1.23 
Dashed lines demarcate bootstrap 95 percent confidence intervals.24 It is evident 
from Figure 2 that the two distributions are not equal. This is formally confirmed 
by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing  ˜  f and the empirical distribution anal-
ogously constructed from 10,000 samples of 702 observations drawn from   f , 
which rejects at the 0.1 percent level the equality of the distributions for values 
of exp(ε)​≥​1. Given the gap between the distributions, it would strain credulity 
to conclude that unobserved heterogeneity could account for the threewise failure 
rate under the benchmark test. For instance, according to  ˜  f , approximately 30 per-
cent of households would require exp(​ε​iH )​≥​2 to rationalize their three deduct-
ible choices, but according to   f , the probability of exp(​ε​iH )​≥​2 is approximately 5 
percent. Moreover,  ˜  f suggests that at least 10 percent of households would require 
exp(​ε​iH )​≥​4 to rationalize their three deductible choices, but   f suggest that the 
probability of exp(​ε​iH )​≥​ 4 essentially is nil. Even if we take a very conserva-
tive approach and compare the upper bound of the confidence interval for  ˜  f with 
23 It is not meaningful to compare  ˜  f and   f for small values of exp(ε) because our procedure for constructing  ˜  f 
involves setting exp(​˜  ε​iM​b  )​=​ 0 if   λ​iH​b  ∈​Λ​i​b , resulting in a point mass at zero.
24 The bootstrap 95 percent confidence interval for   f reflects the bootstrap 95 percent confidence interval for   α​H .
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the lower bound of the confidence interval for   f , the gap appears insurmountable. 
Accordingly, we conclude that unobserved heterogeneity cannot plausibly explain 
the low success rates under the benchmark model.
Anatomy of failure.—For households whose test intervals are empty or fail to 
intersect, it is natural to ask whether they exhibit any patterns in their characteristics 
or choices.
There is a clear pattern among the empty test intervals: 70 percent of the empty test 
intervals in auto collision are attributable to households who purchased or renewed 
their coverage from Company A, and 68 percent of the empty test intervals in auto 
comprehensive are attributable to households who purchased their coverage from 
Company C. What’s special about Company A and Company C? In comparison to 
their peers, Company A has a relatively flat multiplication rule for auto collision, 
and Company C has a relatively flat multiplication rule for auto comprehensive. 
Given a deductible choice, the set of claim rates for which the corresponding test 
interval is nonempty is smaller under a flat multiplication rule than it is under a steep 
multiplication rule. In the extreme, under a perfectly flat multiplication rule, the set 
is empty given any “interior” deductible choice. The intuition is straightforward. 
Under a perfectly flat multiplication rule, it is costless to decrease the deductible and 
enjoy greater coverage, so whatever its claim rate, a household should choose the 
minimum deductible option. As the multiplication rule becomes steeper, the costs of 
decreasing the deductible increase relative to the benefits in terms of greater cover-
age, so it becomes increasingly worthwhile for households with low claim rates to 
increase the deductible. Though interesting, the phenomena of empty test intervals 
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should not be overemphasized. We show below that under CARA utility, the indi-
vidual success rates increase to nearly 100 percent. We also show that despite such 
increases in the individual success rates, the pairwise and threewise success rates 
remain low (see Section VC).
There also are clear patterns in the pairwise position of test intervals for house-
holds with three nonempty intervals but one or more empty intersections (384 
households). Frequently an auto test interval lies to the left (denoted ⊲) of the home 
test interval:   ​iL ⊲​​ ​iH for 54 percent of households and   ​iM ⊲​​ ​iH for 63 percent of 
households. Moreover, when an auto test interval fails to intersect with the home test 
interval, approximately 85 percent of the time the auto test interval lies to the left 
of the home test interval. When the auto test intervals fail to intersect (53 percent 
of households), nearly two-thirds of the time the auto comprehensive test interval 
lies to the left of the auto collision test interval. For households with three empty 
intersections (71 households), the modal threewise position is   ​iM ⊲​​ ​iL ⊲​​ ​iH (83 
percent of households). These patterns suggest that the typical household with three-
wise failure exhibits greater risk aversion in its home deductible choice than in its 
auto deductible choices, and that within auto it exhibits greater risk aversion in its 
collision deductible choice than in its comprehensive deductible choice.
In an effort to quantify the extent to which households with threewise failure are 
more risk averse in the home context than in the auto context, we compare for the 
average household with three nonempty intervals but one or more empty intersec-
tions the risk premium of a “home” lottery offering an equal chance of winning and 
losing $100 with the risk premium of an equivalent “auto” lottery.25 In our calcula-
tions, we assume quadratic utility, under which the risk premium of a lottery p is 
given by R(​p)​=​1/2​Var(​p)​r, where r is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
(Pratt 1964), and we use the average lower bound of the home test intervals and 
the minimum average upper bound of the auto test intervals as conservative esti-
mates of the average household’s absolute risk aversion coefficients in home and 
auto, respectively. We find that the average household’s “home” risk premium is 
$45 whereas its “auto” risk premium is $30. This suggests that the typical household 
with threewise failure is substantially more risk averse in home than it is in auto.
The Web Appendix reports the results of a logit regression in which the dependent 
variable indicates whether the household’s three test intervals are nonempty and 
intersect. The results indicate that if we control for risk type, none of age, gender, or 
wealth is predictive of threewise success under the benchmark test.26
Matching Auto Deductibles.—Nearly 70 percent of the households in the Test 
sample have matching auto deductibles. One could hypothesize that matching auto 
deductibles are indicative of a lack of active decision making. An interesting ques-
tion, therefore, is whether these households have higher or lower success rates than 
25 Recall that the risk premium R(p) of a lottery p is the amount such that the household would be indifferent 
between facing the lottery p and receiving the certainty equivalent C(p)​=​E(p)​−​R(p) (John W. Pratt 1964). 
Stated another way, the risk premium of lottery p is the maximum amount that the household would pay to avoid 
facing lottery p.
26 We also investigate whether the success rates differ for married and unmarried households. We find that the 
success rates (as well as the expected success rates) are slightly higher for unmarried households; however, the dif-
ferences are not material and none of the success rates (or expected success rates) for either subsample materially 
differs from the success rates (or expected success rates) of the full Test sample.
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households without matching auto deductibles. If households with matching auto 
deductibles have lower success rates, this would be consistent with the hypothesis 
and might suggest that what we interpret as inconsistent risk preferences is simply 
inactive decision making. As it turns out, however, the subsample of households 
with matching auto deductibles (488 households) has a higher pairwise success rate 
for their auto deductibles (0.52 versus 0.45), as well as a higher threewise success 
rate (0.25 versus 0.20), than the subsample of households without matching auto 
deductibles (214 households). This result does not support the hypothesis of inac-
tive decision making.
Implied Estimates of Risk Aversion.—As noted in the introduction, the benchmark 
test does not rely on statements about the reasonableness of the magnitude of the 
degree of risk aversion implied by the households’ choices. Nevertheless, we can 
use the households’ test intervals—particularly their auto collision test intervals, 
because there is no unobserved heterogeneity in auto collision (i.e.,   α​L ​=​0 )—
to estimate the range of the degree of absolute risk aversion of the households in 
the Test sample. For households with nonempty, bounded auto collision test inter-
vals, the median lower and upper bounds of their auto collision test intervals are 
2.0​×​1 0​−3 and 8.2​×​1 0​−3 . For the sake of comparison, we note that Cohen and 
Einav (2007) report a benchmark estimate of 6.7​×​1 0​−3 for the absolute risk aver-
sion of the mean individual in their data and that Sydnor (2010) reports baseline 
estimates of 2.0​×​1 0​−3 and 5.3​×​1 0​−3 for the lower and upper bounds on the 
absolute risk aversion of the median $500-deduductible customer in his data.
V. Discussion and Robustness
A. Alternative Test
The basic premise of the test is that if households have stable risk preferences, 
then the pairwise and threewise success rates observed in the data should be close 
to the corresponding success rates generated by the model under the null hypothesis 
of stable risk preferences. In this section we present an alternative test, the basic 
premise of which is that if households have stable risk preferences, then, given the 
households’ auto collision deductible choices, the empirical distributions of auto 
comprehensive and home deductible choices in the data should be close to the cor-
responding distributions generated by the model under the null hypothesis of stable 
risk preferences.
For coverage j​=​M, H, let ϕj​=​(​ϕ​j​1 , … ,  ϕ​j​k ) denote the vector of relative fre-
quencies of deductible choices  d​j​1 , … ,  d​j​k in the data (with N observations) and  Φ​j ​=​(​Φ​j​1 , … ,  Φ​j​k ) denote the vector of relative frequencies of deductible choices
 d​j​1 , … ,  d​j​k generated by the model under the null hypothesis of stable risk preferenc-
es.27 Although the model-generated distribution,  Φ​j , is unique for a given profile of 
risk preferences r​=​​r​1 , … ,  r​N and claim rates λ​=​​λ​1j , … ,  λ​Nj , we do not directly 
27 We do not test auto collision because, as indicated above, the households’ auto collision deductibles are taken 
as given. Specifically, as described below, when we generate  Φ​j we fix each household’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion,  r​i , using its auto collision interval.
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observe r and λ. Therefore, we consider 1,000 possible distributions  Φ​j , which we 
construct as follows. For each household i, we set  r​i equal to the point in an 11-point 
uniform grid over its auto collision interval,   ​iL , which maximizes the probability 
that the household chooses the deductible we observe in the data (auto comprehen-
sive or home, as the case may be).28 We then perform the following routine 1,000 
times: (i) for each household i, we draw exp(​ε​ij ) from gamma(1/​ α​j ,   α​j ) and set λ​ij ​=​​ λ​ij ​×​exp(​ε​ij ); (ii) we determine each household’s optimal deductible choice 
under the model given r and λ; and (iii) we compute  Φ​j​1 , … ,  Φ​j​k .
The alternative test consists of verifying how often  Φ​j belongs to the 99 
 percent Wald confidence ellipsoid for ϕj, which is given by  ​j ​ =​ {​˜  Φ​j : (​˜  ϕ​j​−​​˜  Φ​j )′​(​ˆ  var (​˜  ϕ​j )​)​−1 (​˜  ϕ​j ​−​​˜  Φ​j )​≤​c}, where  ˜  ϕ​j​=​(​ϕ​j​1 , … ,  ϕ​j​k−1 ),  ˜ Φ​j ​ =​ (​Φ​j​1 , … ,  Φ​j​k−1 ),
 ˆ  var (​˜  ϕ​j ) denotes the variance-covariance matrix of  ˜  ϕ​j , and c is the 99th quantile of 
the  χ​2 (k​−​1) distribution. If  Φ​j lies outside  ​j at least 990 times out of 1,000, then 
we reject the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences. This rejection rule is very 
conservative; under it, the size of the test is less than 0.1 percent. Also, the power is 
well behaved, in the sense that it is low for moderate deviations from the null and 
high for large deviations (for details, see the Appendix).
The Appendix contains the results of the alternative test for the Test sample (as 
well as for the various samples and robustness checks considered in Sections VB 
and VC). When we test the equality of the auto comprehensive distributions, the 
rejection rate (i.e., the fraction of times that  Φ​j lies outside  ​j ) is 100 percent for 
every sample. When we test the equality of the home distributions, the rejection rate 
is 100 percent for virtually every sample; the only exception is the subsample of 
Test sample households whose policies were first written or last modified during or 
after 2006, in which case the rejection rate is 99.5 percent. Thus, the results of the 
alternative test stoutly reinforce the conclusion of the principal test—the hypothesis 
of risk preferences is rejected by the data.
The alternative test transparently illustrates the differences between the deduct-
ible choices in the data and the model-generated deductible choices. Consider, for 
example, Figure 3, which compares the joint distribution of auto collision and home 
deductibles in the Test sample (left panel) with the (average) model-generated joint 
distribution (right panel).29 Given their auto collision deductibles, the model pre-
dicts that the households in the Test sample would choose high home deductibles 
($500 or higher) with greater frequency than we observe in the data. (On average, 
the model-generated home deductibles differ from the observed home deductibles 
for at least 263 households, and for at least 183 households the difference equals or 
exceeds $750.) This is another way of saying that the households’ home deductible 
choices imply a greater degree of risk aversion than their auto collision deduct-
ible choices (which accords with the patterns of failure under the benchmark test 
(see Section IVC)). The reverse image emerges when we compare the empirical 
and model-generated joint distributions of auto collision and auto comprehensive 
deductibles: the model predicts a higher frequency of low auto comprehensive 
28 Note that using a 5-point grid or a 21-point grid would not change the results.
29 To avoid “small” cells problems, we group the auto collision deductibles into four bins ($100 or lower, $200 
or $250, $500, and $1,000 or higher) and the home deductibles into three bins ($250 or lower, $500, and $1,000 
or higher).
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deductibles ($250 or lower) than we observe in the data, suggesting that the house-
holds’ auto comprehensive deductible choices imply a lesser degree of risk aversion 
than their auto collision deductible choices (which also accords with the patterns of 
failure under the benchmark test). (On average, the model-generated auto compre-
hensive deductibles differ from the observed auto comprehensive deductibles for at 
least 309 households.)
B. Methodological Concerns
In this section, we address certain concerns regarding our empirical methodology.
 Timing of Purchases.—For each household in the Test sample, we observe its 
most recent policy for each coverage and we construct its coverage-specific pricing 
menus by applying the company-specific multiplication rules in effect in 2007 (see 
Section IIC). Because the majority of the policies in the Test sample are renewal 
policies, there may be a concern that, insofar as households’ deductible choices 
are “sticky” (i.e., insensitive to changes in premiums), certain of the policy choices 
we observe are not a function of the pricing menus that we construct, but rather a 
function of the pricing menus in effect on the date the policy was first written or last 
actively modified. To address this concern, we run the benchmark test on the sub-
sample of Test sample households whose policies were first written or last modified 
during or after 2006.30 Table 6 presents the results.31 As compared to the benchmark 
results, both the success rates and the expected success rates increase somewhat, 
30 The agent’s database shows the status of a policy as either new, renewal, changed, or canceled. A changed 
policy is a policy with one or more changed terms. We consider the effective date of a changed policy as the date on 
which the policy was last actively modified. Although we cannot observe whether the changes involve the deduct-
ible, we consider any change as indicating (or at the very least prompting) active reconsideration of the policy, 
including the choice of deductible.
31 It is worth noting that the results barely change if we expand the time frame to include policies first written or 
last modified during or after 2005, 2004, or 2003.
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with the former increasing somewhat more than the latter. All in all, however, the 
results do not differ materially from the benchmark results; the pairwise and three-
wise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected success rates.32
Two related concerns are that households first purchased their auto and home 
policies at different times and that different household members made the auto and 
home policy choices.33 To address these concerns, we run the benchmark test on two 
subsamples: the subsample of 179 Test sample households who first purchased or 
last modified their auto and home policies within 6 months of each other and the 
subsample of 201 Test sample households with one member.34 For each subsample, 
the pairwise and threewise success rates are well below (and outside the confidence 
interval for) the corresponding expected success rates. The threewise success rates 
for the subsamples are 26 percent and 28 percent, respectively, whereas the cor-
responding expected success rates are 50 percent (with a 95 percent confidence 
interval of [0.43, 0.57]) and 54 percent (with a 95 percent confidence interval of 
[0.46, 0.62]), respectively.
 Construction of Predicted Claim Rates.—We use the Auto and Home samples to 
perform the regressions described in Section IIIA and then use the results of these 
regressions to construct the predicted claims rates for the households in the Test 
sample. The Test sample, however, neither comprises nor is a strict subset of the 
intersection of the Auto and Home samples.35 Therefore, even though we cannot 
32 We also run the benchmark test on the subsample of Auto sample households whose policies were first written 
or last modified during or after 2006. The Web Appendix contains the results, as well as the benchmark results, for 
the entire Auto sample for purposes of comparison. The success rates in the Auto sample are substantially the same 
as the success rates in the Test sample. Moreover, restricting the Auto sample to households with policies first writ-
ten or last modified during or after 2006 does not materially alter the results—the success rates remain well below 
the corresponding expected success rates.
33 Two recent papers that examine the stability of risk preferences over time are Steffen Andersen et al. (2008) 
and Manel Baucells and Antonio Villasís (2010). One recent paper that studies covariation of risk preferences 
among household members is Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009).
34 We consider a household to have one member if its auto policy lists only one vehicle and a sole, unmarried 
driver.
35 Of the 702 households in the Test sample, 265 are in the Auto and Home samples, 60 are in the Auto sample 
but not the Home sample, 201 are in the Home sample but not the Auto sample, and 176 are in neither regression 
sample. The principal reason why a household in the Test sample is not in a regression sample is because the house-
hold has an older policy for which we cannot pinpoint the exact date it was first written. Although we often have 
complete claims information for the household, because we cannot precisely compute the duration of its policy, we 
conservatively exclude the household from the regression sample.
Table 6—Success Rates: Policies First Written or Last Modified during or after 2006
Success Expected 95 percent
Deductible choice(s) Observations rate success rate confidence interval
Auto collision 187 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Auto comprehensive 187 0.89 0.99 0.98 1.00
Home 138 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 187 0.56 0.77 0.72 0.81
Auto collision and home 72 0.56 0.73 0.65 0.81
Auto comprehensive and home 72 0.56 0.77 0.67 0.86
Auto collision and auto comprehensive and home 72 0.29 0.54 0.43 0.65
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reject the equality of the empirical distributions of the predicted claim rates in the 
Auto and Home samples, on the one hand, and the Test sample, on the other hand 
(see Section IVA), it nevertheless is possible that the relationship between observ-
able household characteristics and household risk type (claim rate) is different in the 
Test sample than it is in the regression samples. Although in our opinion there is no 
reason to believe that there is a correlation between risk type in auto or home and 
the criteria for inclusion in the Auto, Home, or Test sample, we perform two checks 
to address this concern. Both involve testing the “intersection subsample”—the sub-
sample of 265 Test sample households that also appear in both regression samples. 
In the first check, we construct the test intervals using the benchmark claim rates, 
i.e., the claim rates predicted using the regression results reported in Section IVA. In 
the second check, we construct the test intervals using “subsample claim rates,” i.e., 
claim rates predicted from regressions in which we restrict each regression sample 
to the intersection subsample. The results are set forth in Table 7. Comparing the 
results to the benchmark test results set forth in Table 5, we find no material differ-
ences; on the contrary, they are substantially similar.36
Claims Information.—In the benchmark test, we assume that household i’ s claim 
rate for coverage j is a (stochastic) function of observable household character-
istics only. Specifically, we assume  λ​ij ​=​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j )⋅exp(​ε​ij ), where  x​ij is a vector 
of observable household characteristics and exp(​ε​ij )​∼​gamma(1/​ α​j 1,   α​j ), which 
implies E(exp(​ε​ij ))​=​1. We then use   λ​ij ​=​E(​λ​ij |  x​ij )​=​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j ) as household 
i’ s predicted claim rate for coverage j​=​L, M, H for purposes of computing the 
test intervals/success rates, and   λ​ij ​×​exp(​ε​ij ) as its true claim rate for coverage 
j​=​M, H for purposes of computing the expected success rates (see Section IIIB). 
For households for whom we have claims information, however, we could utilize 
this information to further refine our inference about their claim rates. If  z​ij denotes 
the number of claims that household i with characteristics  x​ij realizes under cover-
age j with duration  t​ij , then
 exp(​ε​ij )​|​ z​ij ∼​ gamma  ( 1 _​​ α​j   +​ ​z​ij ,   α​j /1​+​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j )​t​ij   α​j ) ,
which implies
 E(exp ( ε​ij ) |​ z​ij )​=​ ​ 1​+​​z​ij   α​j   __​​
1​+​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j )​t​ij   α​j 
  .
Were we to modify the test to incorporate households’ claims information, there-
fore, we would assign higher claim rates to households who realize a greater number 
of claims, all else equal. In particular, we would use
​ ​ λ​ij ​ =​E(​λ​ij |​ x​ij ,  z​ij ,  t​ij )​=​ exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j )​×​​ 1​+​​z​ij   α​j   __​​
1​+​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j )​t​ij   α​j 
  
36 One noteworthy difference when we use the subsample claim rates is that the expected success rates increase. 
This is because our estimates for  α​j (unobserved heterogeneity) decrease when we restrict each regression to the 
subsample.
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as household i’ s predicted claim rate for coverage j​=​L, M, H for purposes of com-
puting the test intervals/success rates, and exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j )​×​exp(​ε​ij )​|​ z​ij as its true claim 
rate for coverage j​=​M, H for purposes of computing the expected success rates. 
As it turns out, however, modifying the test to incorporate claims information does 
not meaningfully affect the benchmark results. Whether we look at the full Test sam-
ple (where we have auto claims information for 452 households and home claims 
information for 466 households) or the intersection subsample (where we have auto 
and home claims information for all households), the results barely change when 
we incorporate claims information (see Table 8).37 Likewise, incorporating claims 
information does not meaningfully affect any of the other results and robustness 
checks presented in Sections VB and VC.
C. Model Assumptions
In this section, we explore the robustness of our benchmark test results to alterna-
tive modeling assumptions.
37 The benchmark results for the intersection subsample are reported in Table 7.
Table 7—Success Rates: Intersection Subsample
Test sample Intersection subsample
Expected 95 percent Expected 95 percent
Sucess success confidence Sucess success confidence
Deductible choice(s) rate rate interval rate rate interval
Auto collision 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Auto comprehensive 0.88 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00
Home 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
Auto coll. and auto comp. 0.53 0.71 0.67 0.75 0.44 0.91 0.91 0.91
Auto coll. and home 0.49 0.68 0.64 0.72 0.54 0.78 0.74 0.81
Auto comp. and home 0.39 0.76 0.71 0.80 0.34 0.91 0.88 0.94
Auto coll. and auto comp. and home 0.23 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.20 0.74 0.70 0.78
Table 8—Success Rates: Claims Information
Test sample Intersection subsample
Expected 95 percent Expected 95 percent
Sucess success confidence Sucess success confidence
Deductible choice(s) rate rate interval rate rate interval
Auto collision 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Auto comprehensive 0.89 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.88 0.99 0.98 1.00
Home 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00
Auto coll. and auto comp. 0.48 0.73 0.71 0.75 0.53 0.72 0.68 0.76
Auto coll. and home 0.48 0.70 0.67 0.72 0.49 0.71 0.67 0.75
Auto comp. and home 0.41 0.77 0.74 0.80 0.36 0.78 0.73 0.83
Auto coll. and auto comp. and home 0.23 0.53 0.49 0.56 0.21 0.53 0.47 0.58
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CARA Utility.—The benchmark model assumes that the Bernoulli utility function 
has a negligible third derivative. Under this assumption, a household’s coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion is a “sufficient statistic” for its risk preferences. However, one 
might question this assumption, particularly in light of the importance of the third 
derivative in other literatures in economics and insurance, including the precau-
tionary saving literature (e.g., Kimball 1990) and the life insurance literature (e.g., 
Nicholas Economides 1982).
Following Cohen and Einav (2007), we check the robustness of the benchmark 
test results to this assumption by considering the case of CARA utility.38 Under 
CARA utility, where u(w)​=​−​exp(−​r w), equation (2) becomes
​ ​λ​ij ​ =​ ​ ​r​ij​
l,h (​​p​ij​l  −​​p​ij​h )​​__​​
exp(​r​ij​l,h d​ij​h )​−​exp(​r​ij​l,h d​ij​l  )​.
Although this equation does not admit a closed-form solution for  r​ij​l,h , a straightfor-
ward application of the intermediate value theorem establishes that a unique positive 
solution exists. Hence, as before, we can construct household i’ s test intervals from 
its deductible choices.
Table 9 reports the success rates and expected success rates under CARA utility.39 
The success rates under CARA utility are higher than the benchmark success rates. 
Indeed, the individual success rates are nearly 100 percent for auto collision and 
auto comprehensive and reach 100 percent for home. However, the pairwise and 
threewise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected success rates, 
which also are higher under CARA utility.
Probability Weighting.—The benchmark model assumes not only that each 
household knows its objective claim rates but that the decision weights that enter 
its expected utility calculus correspond to its objective claim rates. We probe the 
sensitivity of the benchmark test results to this assumption by allowing for the pos-
sibility that households distort their claim rates in the manner suggested by cumula-
tive prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Specifically, we assume that 
households weight their claim rates according to the inverse-S-shaped probability 
weighting function  π​i (​λ​ij )​=​(​λ​ij )​γ​/[(​λ​ij )​γ​+​(1​−​​λ​ij )​γ​​]​1/γ​, where γ​≤​1, and (to 
preserve monotonicity) that they evaluate their choice of deductible according to 
the rank dependent value function Vi (​pij,  d​ij )​=​​(1​−​​π​i (​λ​ij )​t​ij ) ​×​u (w​i ​−​pij  t​ij )​+​π​i (​λ​ij )​t​ij ​×​u (w​i ​−​pij t​ij ​−​​d​ij ).40
Table 10 reports the success rates and expected success rates for selected val-
ues of the parameter γ, including the estimate reported by Tversky and Kahneman 
38 As noted by Cohen and Einav (2007), CARA utility allows for a positive third derivative without expanding 
the dimensionality of preferences (i.e., household i’ s preferences still may be summarized by a single parameter,  r​i 
, the household’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion) or requiring us to make additional assumptions about house-
holds’ wealth levels.
39 As in the benchmark test, we calculate household i’ s test intervals {​ ​ij :​j​=​L, M, H } using its predicted claim 
rates {​ λ​ij ​=​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j ): j​=​L, M, H }.
40 For purposes of our analysis in this section, we normalize  p​ij and  λ​ij to reflect semiannual premiums and claim 
rates for each coverage j.
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(1992) (γ​=​0.69).41 For low values of γ, the threewise success rates with probabil-
ity weighting are higher than the benchmark threewise success rates. This is because 
for low values of γ the average household overweights its home claim rate more 
than it overweights its auto claim rates, which partially accounts for the typical pat-
tern of failure (i.e., greater risk aversion in home than in auto).42 Nevertheless, the 
pairwise and threewise success rates remain well below the corresponding expected 
success rates, which also increase from their benchmark levels. For moderate and 
high values of γ, the average household overweights its auto claim rates more than 
it overweights its home claim rate; as a result, the success rates with probability 
weighting are lower than the benchmark success rates and remain well below the 
corresponding expected success rates.
Prospect Theory.—We assume that households make their deductible choices 
according to expected utility theory. A recent study by Sydnor (2006), however, finds 
that a variant of cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992)—the 
41 In addition to the values of γ reported in Table 10, we consider 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.25, 0.55, and 0.85: the three-
wise success rates (expected success rates) are 0.30 (0.92), 0.30 (0.93), 0.18 (0.85), 0.09 (0.73), 0.08 (0.46), and 
0.21 (0.50), respectively. All together, the results suggest a U-shaped relationship between γ and the success rate.
42 Indeed, for γ​=​0.16, the average household overweights its home claim rate and underweights its auto claim 
rates. For even lower values of γ, the average household underweights all its claim rates, with home underweighted 
less than auto. The threewise success rate, however, appears to plateau around 30 percent.
Table 9—Success Rates: CARA Utility
Success Expected 95 percent
Deductible choice(s) rate success rate confidence interval
Auto collision 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Auto comprehensive 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
Home 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.63 0.83 0.80 0.85
Auto collision and home 0.54 0.84 0.81 0.86
Auto comprehensive and home 0.48 0.82 0.79 0.84
Auto collision and auto comprehensive and home 0.30 0.66 0.63 0.69
Table 10—Success Rates: Probability Weighting
γ = 0.16  γ = 0.40  γ = 0.69
Expected Expected Expected
Success success Success success Success success
Deductible choice(s) rate rate rate rate rate rate
Auto collision 0.97 0.97 0.55 0.55 0.76 0.76
Auto comprehensive 0.89 1.00 0.34 0.98 0.60 0.96
Home 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.98 0.97 0.97
Auto coll. and auto comp. 0.46 0.96 0.12 0.52 0.29 0.62
Auto coll. and home 0.64 0.95 0.33 0.51 0.45 0.63
Auto comp. and home 0.46 0.99 0.12 0.94 0.27 0.79
Auto coll. and auto comp. and home 0.25 0.93 0.05 0.48 0.15 0.49
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 so-called “no loss aversion in buying” specification (Nathan Novemsky and Kahneman 
2005), in which payments made for purchase (including insurance  premiums) 
are treated as negative gains instead of losses (David H. Krantz and Kunreuther 
2007)—does a better job than expected utility theory of explaining observed home 
deductible choices in data similar to ours. It behooves us, therefore, to verify the 
robustness of the benchmark success rates to Sydnor’s model. Under his model, 
household i chooses policy (​pij,  d​ij ) to maximize  V​i (​pij,  d​ij )​=​v(−​​p​ij )​+​π(​λ​ij  t​ij )​×​ξ​ij ​×​v(−​​d​ij ), where  ξ​ij is the coefficient of loss aversion. The functional forms 
of the value function and the probability weighting function are given by v(−​x)
=​−​(x )​ρ​ and π(x)​=​ (x )​γ​/[(x )​γ​+​(1​−​x )​γ​]​1/γ​, and the shape parameters are
ρ​=​0.88 and γ​=​ 0.69. Under this model, the household is indifferent between 
two policies (​​p​ij​l  ,  d​ij​l  ) and (​​p​ij​h ,  d​ij​h ) when
​ ​ξ​ij​l,h ​ =​ ​ (​p​ij​
l
  )​ρ​−​(​​p​ij​h )​ρ​​​__​π(​λ​ij t​ij )[(​d​ij​h )​ρ​−​(​d​ij​l  )​ρ​]​.
Let  ξ​i denote the household’s true coefficient of loss aversion. By the same logic 
set forth in Section IB, when the household chooses policy (​​p​ij​k ,  d​ij​k ) from pricing 
menu  ​ij ​=​{(​​p​ij​k ,  d​ij​k ):​k​=​1, … , k }, its choice identifies an interval,  ​ij , that 
contains its coefficient of loss aversion, and we can check whether its test intervals 
{​​ij ​:​j​=​L, M, H } are nonempty and intersect. The Web Appendix reports the 
success rates and expected success rates under Sydnor’s prospect theory model. The 
pairwise and threewise success rates are uniformly lower under Sydnor’s model and 
they remain far below the corresponding expected success rates.
gamma Errors.—In the model, we assume that ln  λ​ij ​=​​x​ij​′​β​j ​+​​ε​ij , where exp(​ε​ij ) 
follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance  α​j . Under this assump-
tion, the number of claims that household i realizes under coverage j follows a 
negative binomial distribution and, therefore, we can estimate  β​j and  α​j using a 
negative binomial regression model. In addition to being mathematically conve-
nient, the assumption that exp(​ε​ij ) follows a gamma distribution is motivated by 
the fact that the negative binomial distribution historically has provided a good fit 
for accident data (Major Greenwood and G. Udny Yule 1920; Georges Dionne and 
Charles Vanasse 1992). There are many examples of negative binomial regression 
models in the economics and insurance literatures (e.g., Jerry Hausman, Bronwyn 
H. Hall, and Zvi Griliches 1984; Cameron and Trivedi 1986; Marcel Boyer, Dionne, 
and Vanasse 1992; Dionne and Vanasse 1992). Even if exp(​ε​ij ) does not follow a 
gamma distribution, the negative binomial quasi-maximum likelihood estimator for 
β​j is consistent under the conditional mean assumption E(claim s​ij |​ x​ij )​=​exp(​x​i​′β​j )​t​ij 
only; however, the estimator for  α​j generally will be inconsistent if there is any dis-
tributional misspecification (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). Therefore, it is important 
to check the sensitivity of our error variance estimates to this distributional assump-
tion. Under the conditional variance assumption var(claim s​ij |​ x​i )​=​​μ​ij ​+​​α​j μ​ij​2 , it 
is possible to obtain a distribution-free consistent estimator for the error variance 
given an initial estimator for  β​j (Wooldridge 2002). We use the following strongly 
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consistent estimator suggested by Christian Gouriéroux, Alain Monfort, and Alain 
Trognon (1984):43
​ ​ η​j ​ =​ ​​∑​i=1​
N
  ​[​(claims ​ ​ij ​−​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j ))​2 ​−​exp(​x​ij​′​ β​j )]​exp(2 x​ij​′​ β​j )​​​​​____​​​​∑​i=1​N  ​exp(4 x​ij​′​ β​j )
​ ​.
Table 11 compares the point estimates that result from our benchmark negative bino-
mial estimator   α​j with the point estimates that result from the strongly  consistent 
estimator   η​j . The benchmark estimates are slightly higher than the strongly con-
sistent estimates in the case of auto comprehensive and home and slightly lower in 
the case of auto collision. In each case, however, the magnitude of the difference is 
small and the benchmark estimate lies within the 95 percent confidence interval for 
the strongly consistent estimate.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, one still might question whether our analysis 
and conclusions in Section IVC regarding unobserved heterogeneity are robust 
to alternative distributional assumptions. Of course, any sensible alternative error 
distribution must have unit mean and support on the nonnegative real numbers. In 
addition, per the above, the variance of any alternative error distribution should be 
approximately equal to the relevant benchmark estimate in order to be faithful to 
the data. Lastly, Figure 2 suggests that any viable alternative error distribution (i.e., 
any distribution that could rationalize the data) would have to have an extremely 
heavy tail. There is reason to believe, however, that no sensible alternative error dis-
tribution could have a sufficiently heavy tail to be viable. This is because Figure 2 
suggests that the tail of any viable alternative error distribution would have to be 
so heavy that it could not have unit mean. According to  ˜  f (the empirical distribu-
tion of exp(​˜  ε​iH ), the exponential of the “minimum distance” epsilons for home),
E (exp(​˜  ε​iH )​|​exp(​˜  ε​iH )​>​1) ​=​6.83 and Pr(exp(​˜  ε​iH )​>​1)​=​0.56, which implies
E (exp(​˜  ε​iH ))​>​1. Accordingly, we believe that our conclusion regarding the inabil-
ity of unobserved heterogeneity to explain the low benchmark success rates does not 
depend on our assumption of gamma distributed errors.
Claim size.—The model assumes that every claim exceeds the maximum deduct-
ible option for the relevant coverage. Unfortunately, we cannot confirm this assump-
tion for our data because we do not observe claim amounts. However, reports from 
43 Note that   β​j denotes our benchmark negative binomial estimator for  β​j .
Table 11—Error Variance Estimates
Bootstrap
95 percent
​ α​j    η​j confidence interval
Auto collision (​j​=​L) 0.00 0.07 −0.13 0.19
Auto comprehensive (​j​=​M ) 0.22 0.20 −0.12 0.40
Home (​j​=​H ) 0.59 0.51 −0.01 1.57
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studies using similar data support this assumption.44 Furthermore, as long as every 
claim exceeds $500, our benchmark test intervals are conservative for the over-
whelming majority of households in the Test sample. To see this, consider the fol-
lowing example. Suppose that there are two deductible options,  d​h ​>​​d​l , and that 
all claims exceed  d​l , but not  d​h . As before, we can derive an expression for the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion at which the household is indifferent between 
the two deductible choices. Let  ˜  r​l,h denote this coefficient. Note that  ˜  r​l,h ​>​​r​l,h (the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion at which the household is indifferent between 
the two policies under the benchmark assumptions). The intuition is as follows. The 
high deductible,  d​h , is more attractive to the household in the case in which some 
claim amounts are less than  d​h than it is in the benchmark case in which all claims 
amounts exceed  d​h . This is because in the benchmark case all claims result in a loss 
equal to  d​h , whereas in the former case some claims result in a loss less than  d​h . 
Consequently, the degree of risk aversion required for the household to choose the 
low deductible,  d​l , is greater in the benchmark case, which implies  ˜  r​l,h ​>​​r​l,h . In 
general, this example shows that if our claim size assumption were incorrect, then 
the lower and upper bounds of the household’s test interval would be too small. 
However, if all claims exceed $500, this means that our benchmark test intervals 
are conservative for the overwhelming majority of the households in our sample: 
(i) for households with a deductible less than $500, the benchmark test intervals are 
correct; (ii) for households with a $500 deductible, the lower bound of the bench-
mark test interval is too low but the upper bound is correct, which implies that the 
benchmark test interval covers the true test interval; and (iii) for households with a 
deductible in excess of $500, although the benchmark interval does not fully cover 
the true test interval, the fraction of such households in our sample is small (the 
fraction of households with a deductible in excess of $500 is less than 5 percent 
in auto collision, less than 3 percent in auto comprehensive, and approximately 6 
percent in home). In fact, the threewise success rate and expected success rate for 
the subsample of households with deductibles all less than $1,000 (23.9 percent and 
50.4 percent) are nearly identical to the success rate and expected success rates for 
the full Test sample (23.4 percent and 49.6 percent).
Transaction Costs.—The model assumes that the only cost associated with a 
claim is payment of the deductible. In reality, however, there may be other transac-
tion costs associated with filing and pursuing a claim. Abstracting from such trans-
action costs, particularly to the extent that they are greater for home claims than 
they are for auto claims, could bias the results of the benchmark test. As a check 
of the robustness of the benchmark test results to this assumption, we allow for the 
possibility that home claims involve positive transaction costs, ranging from $100 to 
$500 in $100 increments. We find that inclusion of such transaction costs does not 
alter the results in any material respect; the relevant pairwise success rates increase 
44 Using auto data similar to ours with two deductible options, Cohen and Einav (2007) report that 99 percent of 
the claims filed by those insured with the low deductible were for amounts greater than the high deductible option. 
Using home data similar to ours with four deductible options, Sydnor (2010) reports that the average claim at each 
deductible level was greater than the highest deductible option. In addition, using nationwide data, the Insurance 
Information Institute (2010a, b) reports that the typical auto collision and auto comprehensive claims were around 
$3,000 and $1,500 in 2008 and the typical home claim exceeded $8,000 in 2007.
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somewhat (from 0.48 and 0.42 to 0.56 and 0.46), as does the threewise success rate 
(from 0.23 to 0.27), but each remains well below (and outside the confidence inter-
val for) its corresponding expected success rate.
Moral Hazard.—We assume that a household’s deductible choices do not affect 
its claim rates—i.e., there is no moral hazard. Most studies that test for the presence 
of asymmetric information in auto insurance markets using cross-sectional data 
do not find evidence of a positive correlation between risk and coverage (Pierre-
André Chiappori 1999; Chiappori and Salanié 2000; Chiappori et al. 2006; Dionne, 
Gouriéroux, and Vanasse 1999, 2001).45 These studies have been interpreted as cast-
ing doubt on the presence of moral hazard (Cohen 2005), at least in auto insurance. 
Recently, a handful of papers separately test for moral hazard in longitudinal auto 
insurance data using a dynamic approach pioneered by Japp H. Abbring, Chiappori, 
and Jean Pinquet (2003) and Abbring et al. (2003). Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet 
(2003) find no evidence of moral hazard in French auto insurance data. Mark Israel 
(2004) reports a small, but statistically significant, moral hazard effect for drivers 
in Illinois. Abbring, Chiappori, and Tibor Zavadil (2008), Olivia Ceccarini (2008), 
Pinquet et al. (2008), and Dionne, Pierre-Carl Michaud, and Maki Dahchour (2010)
present stronger evidence of moral hazard using auto insurance data from Italy, 
France, the Netherlands, and Quebec, respectively. Each of the foregoing papers, 
however, identifies a moral hazard effect with respect to either liability coverage or a 
composite coverage that confounds liability coverage with other coverages. None of 
them identifies or quantifies the separate moral hazard effect, if any, directly attrib-
utable to the auto coverages we study, i.e., collision and comprehensive. Even if 
moral hazard were an issue with respect to any of the coverages we study,46 it seems 
unlikely that claim rates would be significantly affected by the choice of deductible. 
Each of the deductible options typically represents a small fraction of the insured 
value of the household’s auto or home. As a result, the choice of deductible has a 
small effect on the household’s overall level of coverage.
state Independence.—The model assumes that the Bernoulli utility function is 
state independent. State dependent utility surely is warranted when modeling house-
holds’ choices regarding flight insurance (e.g., Robert Eisner and Robert H. Strotz 
1961; Edi Karni 1983), health and life insurance (e.g., Richard J. Zeckhauser 1970, 
1973; Arrow 1974; Karni 1985; Karni and Itzhak Zilcha 1985; Viscusi and Evans 
1990; Evans and Viscusi 1991), and insurance of irreplaceable commodities (Philip 
J. Cook and Daniel A. Graham 1977). When modeling (as we do) households’ 
choices regarding insurance of replaceable property (autos and homes), however, 
state independent utility seems justified.
45 We are aware of two exceptions: Robert Puelz and Arthur Snow (1994) and Cohen (2005). Recent work 
criticizes the methodology of Puelz and Snow (1994) and suggests that their results are spurious (Chiappori 1999; 
Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse 1999). Cohen (2005) presents mixed evidence of asymmetric information. She 
finds that a positive coverage-accident correlation exists for new customers with more than three years of driving 
experience, but not for new customers with fewer than three years of driving experience. To our knowledge, there 
are no studies that test for asymmetric information in home insurance.
46 To the extent that a household’s claim rates in auto comprehensive and home reflect force majeure risk more 
than household behavior risk, there is reason to believe that moral hazard is not a significant issue in the case of 
these coverages.
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Independence of Claim Rates.—The regression model assumes that within-house-
hold claim rates are independent across coverages. This seems reasonable insofar 
as a household’s claim rates in auto comprehensive and home reflect force majeure 
risk more than household behavior risk. As a check of this assumption, we compute 
pairwise correlations between the observed claim rates for households in the Test 
sample for whom we have claims information. There is essentially no correlation 
between the claim rates in auto and home and a weak positive correlation between 
the auto claim rates.47 This suggests that, assuming within-household independence 
of claim rates is conservative, the patterns of empty intersections documented in 
Section IVC imply that a strong negative correlation between auto and home (par-
ticularly between auto comprehensive and home) would be required to markedly 
improve the success rates. Furthermore, insofar as there is no unobserved heteroge-
neity in auto collision, neither the pairwise success rate test nor the alternative test 
requires the independence assumption.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We examine the hypothesis of stable risk preferences using a unique dataset that 
documents the choices of a sample of households under their auto and home insur-
ance policies. For each household, we test whether its deductible choices across 
three types of coverage—auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home all per-
ils—can be rationalized by the same coefficient of absolute risk aversion. We find 
that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. This is not to 
say that there is no systematic component to the households’ deductible choices. 
After all, the model is quite consistent with the households’ single context choices 
(particularly under the assumption of CARA utility) and outperforms a fully ran-
dom deductible choice model in terms of explaining the households’ joint choices. 
Overall, however, our results call into question the empirical validity of the assump-
tion of context-invariant risk preferences and caution against extrapolating estimates 
of risk preferences across contexts.
What can explain our results? Three alternatives immediately come to mind. First, 
households may have incorrect subjective beliefs about their claim rates. Although 
determining the subjective beliefs of the households in our data is beyond the scope 
of the present study (we cannot directly assess their beliefs, and estimating their 
beliefs from the data would not be straightforward), our analyses of two related 
explanations—unobserved heterogeneity and probability weighting—suggest that 
incorrect subjective beliefs may not be sufficient to explain the results. After all, 
while they offer different economic explanations for our results, each of unobserved 
heterogeneity, probability weighting, and incorrect subjective beliefs offers the same 
mathematical explanation: the claim rates that households use in their expected util-
ity calculus do no equal the predicted claim rates that we use in our test.48 More 
47 Neither the correlation between auto collision and home nor the correlation between auto comprehensive and 
home is statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level. The correlation between auto collision and auto 
comprehensive is 0.12 and is significant at the 10 percent confidence level.
48 The respective economic explanations run as follows: (i) in the case of unobserved heterogeneity, households 
know and use their objective claim rates in their expected utility calculus, but the predicted claim rates are incor-
rect; (ii) in the case of probability weighting, households know their objective claim rates and the predicted claim 
623BARsEgHyAN ET AL.: ARE RIsk PREfERENCEs sTABLE ACROss CONTExTs?VOL. 101 NO. 2
specifically, our analysis of unobserved heterogeneity suggests that households’ 
subjective beliefs would have to be far from the truth to plausibly explain the results. 
Moreover, patterns in the results suggest that households’ subjective claim rates 
in auto comprehensive and home would have to be strongly negatively correlated, 
which seems counterintuitive insofar as such coverages primarily insure against 
events and circumstances beyond households’ control. Our analysis of probability 
weighting suggests that systematically incorrect subjective beliefs cannot explain 
the results, at least to the extent that such beliefs mathematically correspond to the 
decision weights that result from conventional probability weighting.
The second alternative is that households are making mistakes. Such mistakes 
could be incorporated into the model by adding an error term to equation (1) (John 
D. Hey and Chris Orme 1994). While we leave the task of specifying a model of 
deductible choice with mistakes and estimating the distribution of the errors to future 
research, we can use our model to get an idea of the magnitude of the cost of such 
errors. Assuming quadratic utility, treating its predicted claim rate as its true claim 
rate, and taking the midpoint of its auto collision test interval as its true coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion, we calculate the error cost for each household who makes 
a mistake (i.e., who does not choose the optimal deductible given its true claim rate 
and coefficient of absolute risk aversion) as the difference between the certainty 
equivalent of the lottery induced by its optimal deductible choice and the certainty 
equivalent of the lottery induced by its actual deductible choice. For households 
who make mistakes (and have nonempty auto collision intervals), we find that the 
average error cost is $5 in the case of auto comprehensive mistakes (or 6 percent of 
the mean auto comprehensive premium in the Test sample) and $62 in the case of 
home mistakes (or 11 percent of the mean home premium in the Test sample).
The third alternative is that households have stochastic preferences. One model 
of stochastic preferences that appears promising at first glance is the random pref-
erence model (Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden 1995). Under this model, the 
decision maker has core preferences with one or more stochastic parameters. For 
example, were we to specify a random preference model of deductible choice, the 
core preferences would be represented by equation (1) and the stochastic parameter 
would be the household’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion. A key feature of the 
random preference model is that it allows the variance of the stochastic parameter to 
decrease as the stakes of the choice increase. This feature appears to be consistent 
with our data. In addition to deductible choices, the data record choices of limits on 
liability coverages in auto (bodily injury and property damage) and home (personal 
liability). The stakes involved in the choice of liability limits are large relative to the 
stakes involved in the choice of deductibles—the differences among limit options 
constitute tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars. When we plot the distribu-
tion of personal liability limits conditional on the liability limit for bodily injury or 
property, there appears to be a strong correlation among liability limits across con-
texts, which suggests that households’ liability limit choices reflect more stable risk 
preferences than do their deductible choices. Although this fits nicely with the story 
rates are correct, but households use systematic distortions of their objective claim rates as decision weights in their 
expected utility calculus; and (iii) in the case of incorrect subjective beliefs, the predicted claim rates are correct but 
households neither know nor use their objective claim rates in their expected utility calculus.
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of stochastic preferences having variance inversely related to stakes, confirmation 
via our test is outside the scope of this study (estimating liability claim rates would 
be difficult due to data limitations). Furthermore, we wonder whether the variance 
required to rationalize the deductible choices under a stochastic preferences model 
would strike us as reasonable; our analysis of unobserved heterogeneity suggests 
that it would be quite high.
Having previewed directions for future research, let us recap the contributions 
of the present study. The principal contribution is that we present direct evidence 
on the hypothesis that risk preferences are stable across multiple decision contexts 
using data on market choices. In doing so, we believe that we bridge a gap between 
the risk preferences literature, which provides estimates of risk preferences using 
unicontext market data, and the invariance literature, which documents violations 
of invariance using multicontext nonmarket data. A related contribution is that we 
assemble a new dataset that records multiple choices by the same economic units in 
market settings that are characterized by choice sets containing comparable money 
lotteries. Indeed, we presume that the aforementioned gap in the extant literature 
results from the paucity of data with these features being available for academic use. 
Lastly, we develop a method for testing the invariance of structural parameters of 
rational choice models. Notably, both our data and methods are highly portable—
the data are well suited to addressing numerous other research questions concerning 
risk preferences, and our test is readily adaptable to other models of decision mak-
ing under risk and other similar datasets.
Appendix
A. Coverage Descriptions
•  Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused by a col-
lision with another vehicle or object, without regard to fault.
•  Auto comprehensive coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle from all 
other causes (e.g., theft, fire, flood, windstorm, glass breakage, vandalism, hit-
ting or being hit by an animal, or by falling or flying objects), without regard 
to fault. If the insured vehicle is stolen, auto comprehensive coverage also pro-
vides a certain amount per day for transportation expenses (e.g., rental car or 
public transportation).
•  Home all perils coverage pays for damage to the insured home from all causes 
(e.g., fire, windstorm, hail, tornadoes, vandalism, or smoke damage), except 
those that are specifically excluded (e.g., flood, earthquake, or war).
B. size and Power of the Test
The first step in calculating the size of the test is generating hypothetical data 
under the restriction that households have stable risk preferences. For each house-
hold i: (i) we draw a unique coefficient of absolute risk aversion from a uniform 
distribution over its benchmark auto collision interval; (ii) we take   λ​iL as its auto 
collision claim rate; and (iii) we draw exp(​ε​iM ) from gamma(1/​ α​M ,   α​M ) and 
exp(​ε​iH ) from gamma(1/​ α​H ,   α​H ) and take   λ​iM ​×​exp(​ε​iM ) and   λ​iH ​×​exp(​ε​iH ) as its 
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auto comprehensive and home claim rates. We then determine each household’s 
optimal deductible choices for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home cov-
erage given its unique coefficient of absolute risk aversion and its claim rates. The 
next step is performing the test on the hypothetical data—i.e., calculating the test 
intervals, the success rates, the expected success rates, and confidence intervals for 
the expected success rates. In the final step, we repeat the first two steps 1,000 times 
and tabulate the frequency with which we (incorrectly) reject the null hypothesis at 
standard levels of significance. We find that the size of the test is: 1.7 percent at the 
2.5 percent level; 0.8 percent at the 1 percent level; 3.8 percent at the 5 percent level; 
and 8.9 percent at the 10 percent level.
The first step in calculating the power of the test is generating hypothetical data 
under the alternative hypothesis that households do not have stable risk preferences. 
For each household i, we take a draw from a uniform distribution over its benchmark 
auto collision interval and treat the draw as the household’s coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion for auto collision,  r​iL . We then construct the household’s coefficients of 
absolute risk aversion for auto comprehensive and home as follows:
  r​iM ​ =​  ​(1​+​δ​x​iM ) ​​r​iL ;
  r​iH ​ =​  ​(1​+​δ​x​iH ) ​​r​iL ,
where  x​iM and  x​iH are independently drawn from uniform(−1, 1) and δ​>​0 is a 
multiplier that controls the magnitude of the deviation of the alternative hypothesis 
from the null hypothesis  r​iL ​ =​ ​r​iM ​ =​ ​r​iH .49 Next, (i) we take   λ​iL as the household’s 
auto collision claim rate, and (ii) we draw exp(​ε​iM ) from gamma(1/​ α​M ,   α​M ) and 
exp(​ε​iH ) from gamma(1/​ α​H ,   α​H ) and take   λ​iM ​×​ exp(​ε​iM ) and   λ​iH ​×​ exp(​ε​iH ) as 
its auto comprehensive and home claim rates. We then determine each household’s 
optimal deductible choices for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home given 
its coefficients of absolute risk aversion and its claim rates.
Once we generate hypothetical data for a given multiplier δ, the second step is 
performing the test on the hypothetical data—i.e., calculating the test intervals, the 
success rates, the expected success rates, and confidence intervals for the expected 
success rates. In the final step, we repeat the first two steps 1,000 times and tabulate 
the frequency with which we (correctly) reject the null hypothesis at standard levels 
of significance. Table A1 reports the results for various multipliers between 0.25 and 
1.25. The power behaves as expected at each significance level; i.e., the power is low 
for small values of δ and high for large values of δ.
C. Alternative Test Results
Tables A2 and A3 present the results of the alternative test for auto comprehensive 
coverage and home coverage, respectively.
In calculating the size of the alternative test, we first generate hypothetical data 
under the restriction that households have stable risk preferences using the same 
49 To keep  r​iM and  r​iH within reasonable bounds, we impose lower and upper bounds equal to twice the minimum 
finite lower bound and twice the maximum finite upper bound of the relevant test intervals in the Test sample.
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Table A1—Power of the Test
Multiplier
Significance level 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25
1.0 percent 0.008 0.042 0.216 0.791 0.994
2.5 percent 0.024 0.085 0.329 0.895 0.996
5.0 percent 0.043 0.136 0.451 0.940 0.998
10.0 percent 0.090 0.222 0.589 0.967 1.000
Table A2—Alternative Test Results: Auto Comprehensive Coverage
​χ​2 critical value at Minimum value 1% value of Rejection rate
Sample/robustness check 1% sigificance level of test statistic test statistic (percent)
Test sample
Benchmark claim rates 11.34 211.00 221.77 100
Conditional claim rates 11.34 225.00 247.26 100
Test sample—2006 subsample 11.34 20.76 26.76 100
Intersection subsample
Benchmark claim rates 11.34 41.28 41.28 100
Subsample claim rates 11.34 125.53 125.53 100
Conditional claim rates 11.34 86.61 103.82 100
Auto sample 11.34 689.11 720.72 100
Auto sample—2006 subsample 11.34 248.66 282.15 100
CARA utility 11.34 150.81 169.95 100
Probability weighting
​ γ​=​0.16 11.34 474.51 487.55 100
​ γ​=​0.40 11.34 3,728.00 3,809.34 100
​ γ​=​0.69 11.34 1,035.83 1,065.96 100
​ γ​=​ 0.85 11.34 402.34 434.34 100
Prospect theory 11.34 796.76 855.82 100
Transaction costs ($500) 11.34 211.00 221.77 100
Table A3—Alternative Test Results: Home Coverage
​χ​2 critical value at Minimum value 1% value Rejection rate
Sample/robustness check 1% significance level of test statistic of test statistic (percent)
Test sample
Benchmark claim rates 9.21 759.63 789.62 100
Conditional claim rates 9.21 683.85 740.09 100
Test sample—2006 subsample 9.21 5.34 10.74 99.5
Intersection subsample
Benchmark claim rates 9.21 186.43 203.07 100
Subsample claim rates 9.21 66.93 81.89 100
Conditional claim rates 9.21 194.03 210.95 100
CARA utility 9.21 166.41 185.80 100
Probability weighting
​ γ​=​0.16 9.21 59.17 62.51 100
​ γ​=​0.40 9.21 1,472.28 1,484.55 100
​ γ​=​0.69 9.21 761.61 814.32 100
​ γ​=​0.85 9.21 683.27 744.13 100
Prospect theory 9.21 1,534.40 1,601.30 100
Transaction costs ($500) 9.21 395.68 462.20 100
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procedures described above. We then perform the alternative test on the hypothetical 
data—i.e., calculate ϕj, generate  Φ​j 1,000 times, and verify how often  Φ​j belongs to 
the Wald confidence ellipsoid for ϕj (see Section VA). Finally, we repeat the first two 
steps 1,000 times and tabulate the frequency with which we (incorrectly) reject the 
null hypothesis of stable risk preferences at various combinations of the test’s two 
levels, namely, (i) the level associated with the Wald confidence ellipsoid and (ii) the 
level implied by the rejection rule.50 The results are set forth in Table A4.51 As we can 
see, the size of the alternative test is quite small at low levels. This is hardly surpris-
ing. After all, if households have stable risk preferences, then we would expect  Φ​j to 
lie inside the Wald confidence ellipsoid of  ϕ​j very frequently. Therefore, if we adopt 
a rejection rule pursuant to which we reject the null hypothesis of stable risk prefer-
ences only if  Φ​j lies outside the Wald confidence ellipsoid very frequently, then the 
probability of making a Type I error should be quite low. Consider, for example, the 
level combination (1 percent, 1 percent). At the true r and λ, the model-generated 
distribution would lie outside Wald confidence ellipsoid (and thereby lead us to 
incorrectly reject the null) approximately 1 percent of the time. Our approach makes 
the test even more conservative. First, the way we fix r effectively minimizes the 
distance between the empirical and model-generated distributions for any given λ. 
Second, insofar as some realizations of λ could further reduce the gap between the 
data and the model, requiring that only 10 out of 1,000 realizations of λ generate a 
distribution  Φ​j that lies inside the Wald confidence ellipsoid essentially reduces the 
probability of making a Type I error to nil.
In calculating the power of the alternative test, we first generate hypothetical data 
under the alternative hypothesis that households do not have stable risk preferences 
using the same procedures described above. Once we generate hypothetical data 
for a given multiplier δ, we then perform the alternative test on the hypothetical 
data—i.e., calculate ϕj, generate  Φ​j 1,000 times, and verify how often  Φ​j belongs 
to the Wald confidence ellipsoid for ϕj (see Section VA). Finally, we repeat the first 
two steps 1,000 times and tabulate the frequency with which we (correctly) reject 
50 For instance, (i) if we use the 99 percent Wald confidence ellipsoid, the associated level is 1 percent, and (ii) 
if we reject the null hypothesis if  Φ​j lies outside  ​j at least 990 times out of 1,000, the implied level is 1 percent.
51 Note that the results of the alternative test reported in Section VA are based on the level combination (1 per-
cent, 1 percent).
Table A4—Size of the Alternative Test
Level implied by
Level associated with Wald ellipsoid
“rejection rate” rule 1 percent 2.5 percent 5 percent 10 percent
1 percent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 percent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 percent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
20 percent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
50 percent 0.000 0.006 0.019 0.060
75 percent 0.016 0.052 0.101 0.237
90 percent 0.085 0.202 0.350 0.606
95 percent 0.194 0.373 0.594 0.852
99 percent 0.550 0.803 0.985 1.000
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the null hypothesis of stable risk preferences at six combinations of the test’s two 
levels. Table A5 reports the results for various multipliers between 0.25 and 1.25. 
The power behaves as expected at each test level combination.
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